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CHEATING ON ONLINE ASSESSMENT TESTS: PREVELANCE AND IMPACT ON 
VALIDITY 
 
Online tests are a relatively efficient way to assess large numbers of job candidates and 
are becoming increasingly popular with organizations. Due to their unproctored nature, however, 
online selection tests provide the potential for candidates to cheat, which may undermine the 
validity of these tests for selecting qualified candidates. The purpose of this study was to test the 
appropriateness of utility theory as a framework for understanding decision-making in regard to 
cheating on an online cognitive ability test (CAT) by manipulating the probability of passing the 
test with cheating, the probability of being caught cheating, and the value of being caught 
cheating in two samples: 518 adults recruited through Amazon mTurk, and 384 undergraduate 
students. The probability of being caught cheating significantly affected performance on the 
CAT for the mTurk sample, but not for the student sample, and significantly moderated the 
relationship between CAT score during session one and CAT score during session two for the 
student sample. Neither the probability of being caught cheating nor the value of being caught 
cheating significantly affected CAT performance or validity in either sample. Findings regarding 
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Unproctored Internet testing (UIT) is a relatively new selection procedure whereby 
selection tests are administered to job candidates via the Internet and without the presence of a 
human proctor (Tippins, 2009; Tippins et al., 2006; Lievens & Burke, 2011). The evolving use of 
technology in selection procedures was noted as early as 2003 (Chapman & Webster, 2003). By 
2008, 100% of Fortune 500 companies employed some sort of online application procedure 
(Younger, 2008), and two-thirds of all employers used some sort of Internet testing as part of 
their application procedures (Fallaw, Solomonson, & McClelland, 2009). Recent research 
published by practitioners shows continued interest in the topic (e.g., Hense, 2009; Gibby, 2009; 
Reynolds, 2009).  
Benefits of UIT 
For organizations, there are many perceived benefits to UIT that make it attractive as a 
selection procedure, including reduced costs, an increased applicant pool, and consistency in 
administration and scoring of selection tests.  
Reduced Costs 
UIT reduces the costs of test administration and screening time for job applicants (Gibby 
et al., 2009). Organizations do not need to hire and train proctors, or send them to testing 
locations; testing equipment does not need to be purchased, distributed, or maintained; and 
compared to traditional testing programs, it is cheaper and easier to update and adjust Internet 
delivered selection tests (Tippins, 2009). Internet testing is also “scalable,” which means that 
organizations can drastically increase the number of candidates who complete the selection test 
without an accompanying increase in administration costs. The cost of maintaining an Internet 
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test is roughly the same regardless of how many candidates actually complete the test (Naglieri 
et al., 2004).  
There are multiple empirical and case studies that demonstrate these savings. Bank of 
America, for example, replaced telephone screening with more efficient and objective 
unproctored Internet screening for candidates for a customer service position, and were rewarded 
with a statistically significant 68% drop in mean time spent screening candidates (from 23 
minutes to eight minutes), without any drop in predictive validity (Hense, 2009). Proctor and 
Gamble instituted an unproctored Internet cognitive ability test, and, in one year, reduced the 
number of supervised paper-and-pencil tests administered in Japan by 10,000 (Gibby, 2009).  
Increased Applicant Pool 
After time and cost savings, one of the most lauded benefits of UIT is its potential to 
increase the size of the applicant pool (Chapman & Webster, 2003; Naglieri et al., 2004; Tippins, 
2006). Because UIT can be completed anytime, it makes selection tests available to individuals 
who might not be able to attend a proctored testing administration during normal business hours 
(Tippins, 2009). Because UIT can be completed anywhere, it opens up selection tests to 
individuals from geographically diverse regions, including applicants from rural areas, 
international applicants, and, importantly, candidates with physical disabilities that might make it 
difficult to travel to a proctored testing location (Chapman & Webster, 2003; Naglieri et al., 
2004; Reynolds, 2009; Tippins, 2009b). Furthermore, if the applicant pool substantially 
increases, but the number of candidates selected remains constant, then, as long as more highly 





Consistency in Test Administration/ Scoring 
Reduced costs would be a dubious benefit of UIT if it came at the price of the quality of 
test administration. In addition to costs savings, though, UIT is extremely useful for ensuring 
consistency in both the administration and scoring of selection tests (Naglieri et al., 2004; 
Tippins, 2009). UIT, for example, can be used to precisely standardize instructions provided to 
test-takers and enforcement of time limits (Reynold et al., 2009). Technology utilized in UIT can 
be used to score tests objectively, accurately, and almost immediately (Naglieri et al., 2004; 
Tippins, 2009). UIT can also eliminate inconsistencies in test administration and scoring that 
arise from test administrator biases in regard to candidate characteristics such as race, weight, or 
age (Chapman & Webster, 2003).  
Summary 
By considering the benefits of reduced costs, increased applicant pool, and consistency in 
test administration and scoring, it is not difficult to understand why UIT is increasingly used by 
organizations as a selection procedure. These benefits, however, must be weighed against the 
drawbacks of UIT, which will be discussed next.  
Drawbacks of UIT 
UIT has many benefits, but they come at a price. Potential drawbacks of UIT include 
problems with technology, compromised test security, lack of environmental standardization, 
and cheating.  
Problems with Technology 
In order to complete UIT, candidates need Internet access and an electronic device 
capable of connecting to the Internet. These requirements can lead to problems with Internet 
connectivity and computer processing speed (Tippins, 2006; Tippins, 2009). This in turn can 
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cause candidate frustration and reduce completion rates (Hense, 2009), and can compromise the 
standardization of administration, which can in turn compromise test validity (Potosky & Bobko, 
2004). For example, if candidates need to watch a video or examine a figure in order to answer a 
test item, but the video or figure fails to load for some candidates, they will be unlikely to answer 
that item correctly, regardless of their underlying ability. If this happens on several items during 
the test administration, candidates might give up without completing the test.  
Compromised Test Security 
Another major drawback of UIT is that administering tests online might severely threaten 
test security. When test content is placed online, candidates can copy it in order to study it 
themselves or share it with other candidates (Lievens & Burke, 2011; Naglieri et al., 2004). In 
the case of proprietary tests, competitors might be able to copy the test material in order to use in 
their own product design or marketing (Chapman & Webster, 2003). This proliferation of test 
materials potentially undermines the validity of the selection instrument, especially in the case of 
cognitive ability tests (Lievens & Burke, 2011). Candidates who have access to test items prior 
to test administration can find the correct answers to these items using forbidden outside 
resources, allowing them to achieve a score on the test that is not truly reflective of the 
underlying knowledge, skill, or ability the test was designed to measure.  
Lack of Environmental Standardization 
Though UIT helps ensure standardization in instructions across testing situations, it does 
nothing to ensure the environment in which candidates complete the test is standardized 
(Naglieri et al., 2004). Good testing practices require that candidates complete the test under 
conditions that facilitate their best possible performance on the test (Tippins, 2009). With UIT, 
however, candidates are allowed to take the test wherever they please, which means that the test-
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taking environment could be full of noise, people, or other distractions, in addition to the 
technological idiosyncrasies listed above (e.g., Internet connection speed, processing speed of 
the electronic device used to complete the test) (Potosky & Bobko, 2004; Reynolds et al., 2009; 
Tippins, 2009b). These environmental conditions can affect candidate performance, which in 
turn can affect the reliability and validity of a candidate’s test score (Beaty, 2011; Lievens & 
Burke, 2011; Naglieri et al., 2004).  
Discrimination 
Though one of the benefits of UIT is that it enlarges the applicant pool by making the test 
more convenient for candidates to complete, there is currently a debate about for which 
candidates UIT is more convenient. Because UIT requires an electronic device with Internet 
access, UIT may unfairly deny employment opportunities to candidates who do not have such 
access. These include candidates of lower socioeconomic status, older candidates, minorities, 
and candidates outside of the United States (Naglieri et al., 2004; Nye, 2008; Reynolds et al., 
2009). Even when candidates within these groups can access the test, their lack of familiarity 
with modern technology may negatively influence perceptions of the organization and test 
performance (Naglieri, 2004; Nye, 2008). Although outside the scope of this investigation, this 
phenomenon raises important questions about UIT and its potential for adverse impact (Chapman 
& Webster, 2003). Minorities in the categories listed above might perform poorly on UIT 
because they are unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the technology upon which those tests are 
administered (e.g., difficulty navigating the testing interface), and not because of any deficit in 
the underlying ability the test is designed to measure. Qualified minority candidates could be 
unfairly denied job opportunities because of a characteristic (e.g., familiarity with the technology 




By far the greatest concern discussed in the literature on UIT is the impact of cheating on 
test scores (for example Beaty et al., 2011; Lievens & Burke, 2011; Naglieri et al., 2004; and for 
a thorough discussion, see Tippins et al., 2006). The next section of this manuscript will cover 
that topic in detail.  
Summary 
UIT offers many benefits to organizations, but comes with accompanying challenges and 
drawbacks, including problems with technology, compromised test security, lack of 
environmental standardization, and cheating. Cheating is perhaps the greatest concern of both 
practitioners and researchers, and will be discussed in detail below.  
Cheating 
Cheating is routinely noted as one of the biggest concerns associated with UIT (Tippins, 
2009a; Tippins, 2009b; Tippins et al., 2006). Although often discussed, cheating is rarely 
explicitly defined, at least within the organizational literature.  
Tippins (2006) defined cheating as any strategy, “by which people attempt to ‘game’ or 
compromise the testing situation for their personal advantage (or the advantage of others), 
resulting in test scores that do not accurately reflect an individual’s standing on whatever the test 
is measuring,” (p. 206). Lievens and Burke (2011) defined it as, “obtaining a score through 
prohibited materials, others’ help or others impersonating applicants so that applicants’ scores do 
not reflect their standing on the construct” (pp. 817-818). The educational literature can be of 
some help here, in which cheating is defined as the use of prohibited materials or assistance to 
undermine the assessment process (Garavalia et al. 2007). Drawing upon each of these 
definitions, in this manuscript, I define cheating as the purposeful use of prohibited materials or 
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assistance to undermine the validity of the assessment. Cheating is problematic precisely because 
it compromises test validity. Since selection tests are designed to identify highly qualified 
candidates for job positions; cheating undermines their ability to do so, meaning that the 
candidates who score well are not necessarily the best candidates for the job (Lievens & Burke, 
2011).  
Methods of Cheating 
Methods of cheating are limited only by test-takers’ imagination. Several of the more 
common methods, including the use of outside resources, taking advantage of compromised test 
security, and using a test surrogate, are discussed below.  
Use of Outside Resources 
UIT is, by definition, unproctored, meaning that there is no proctor present to guarantee 
that the candidate completes the test without the use of prohibited materials (Lievens, 2002). 
Candidates completing UIT have Internet access, which means that they have access to a nearly 
limitless knowledge through browser search engines; this access may provide them answers to 
test questions. Outside resources could also include reference books or even a knowledgeable 
friend (Lievens & Burke, 2011). The use of these resources may very well alter a candidate’s 
score so that it no longer accurately reflects the candidate’s standing on whatever construct is 
being tested (Lievens, & Burke).  
Compromised Test Security 
Compromised test security refers specifically to a situation in which test-takers have 
access to test questions prior to completing the test (Drasgow, Nye, Guo, & Tay, 2009; Lievens 
& Burke, 2011; Naglieri et al., 2004; Tippins, 2009). As with access to outside resources, having 
access to test questions before officially taking the test could undermine test validity (Lievens & 
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Burke, 2011) by allowing candidates to become more comfortable with test content, and to 
memorize answers in advance of the test (Tippins, 2009). Note too that endorsing a test with 
compromised test security could be an ethical violation. The APA Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American Psychological Association, 2002), section 9.11 
specifically requires that psychologists make reasonable efforts to maintain the integrity and 
security of test materials.  
Use of Test Surrogate 
A test surrogate refers to someone other than the identified candidate completing the 
selection instrument (Tippins, 2006). As several authors have noted, it is nearly impossible to 
verify candidate identity during UIT (Beaty, 2011; Lievens & Burke, 2011; Naglieri, 2004; 
Tippins, 2006; Tippins, 2009). The consequences of this method are obvious: though the test-
taker may have performed extremely well on the selection instrument, it is difficult to verify that 
the person being hired and the test-taker are the same individual, or that the score on the UIT 
reflects the candidate’s knowledge or ability to perform well on the job. In this case, the validity 
of the test might be extremely low for those job candidates who used surrogates, because the test 
score is not reflective of their individual abilities.  
Summary 
Candidates can cheat in several ways, including using outside materials, taking advantage 
of compromised test security, and using a test surrogate. Cheating is useful for candidates 
because it potentially allows them to exaggerate their qualifications for a specific job. Cheating 
is problematic for organizations for the exact same reason: if candidates cheat, their scores are 
not reflective of their qualifications for employment, meaning that the candidates selected are not 
9 
 
necessarily the most qualified for the job, wasting organizational resources and negatively 
impacting organizational effectiveness.  
Prevalence of Cheating on UIT 
There is currently little to no empirical evidence on the extent of cheating, the conditions 
that encourage or discourage cheating, and/or the impact of cheating on the validity and 
effectiveness of UIT (Tippins, 2009b). Despite several calls for such research (e.g., Naglieri et 
al., 2004; Tippins, 2006), there have been only a handful of studies on the topic, all of which are 
limited methodologically (Arthur, 2009; Beaty, 2011; Nye, 2008). To confuse the topic even 
more, these studies have often found contradictory results. Some researchers have found no 
differences on proctored vs. unproctored tests, others have found higher scores in the 
unproctored condition, and still others have found higher scores in the proctored condition (Do, 
2009). Many of these studies exist only as conference presentations, and are thus not widely 
distributed, and may also be suspect methodologically. Three representative studies, their 
findings, and limitations, are discussed below.  
Arthur (2009) 
A within-subjects design study (N=296) was conducted in which test takers were 
considered to have experienced high-stakes testing and low-stakes retesting.  Specifically, 
participants first completed an unproctored cognitive ability test administered over the Internet as 
job applicants (time one; high stakes), then as research participants (time two; low stakes). The 
test was speeded to make cheating more difficult. Candidates were applying for a variety of 
positions across numerous industries.  
Candidates who scored more than one standard error of the measurement lower on time 
two vs. time one were considered likely cheaters. Using this metric, 7.77% of participants were 
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considered likely cheaters. It is important to note that this could be because of actual cheating, or 
because at time two individuals were less motivated to perform well on the test (e.g., they had 
already received jobs). Because it is impossible to distinguish between the two possible causes of 
score differences, 7.77% represents the upper limit for cheating, with the actual level falling 
anywhere between 0 and 7.77%.  
Limitations. The study included no control group, the researchers did not manipulate 
aspects of the testing situation to make cheating more or less attractive, and only those 
candidates who were hired were retested.  
Do (2005) 
Study 1: Undergraduate sample. Using an undergraduate sample, the researcher 
compared performance of proctored (n=252) and unproctored conditions (n=163) on cognitive 
ability tests. To motivate the students, high performing test-takers were entered into a lottery for 
a $100 prize.  
Despite no significant differences in self-reported SAT or ACT scores, participants in the 
proctored condition performed significantly better than those in the unproctored condition, 
though the effect size was small (d=-.25).  
Study 2: Field sample. In a second study using a field sample, the researcher analyzed 
data from 12,620 job incumbents and applicants for an entry-level management position with a 
retail organization. The proctored condition included 3,116 individuals and the unproctored 
condition included 9,504.  
For the cognitive portion of the test, participants in the unproctored condition scored 
slightly higher (than those in the proctored condition. Probably owing to the large sample size, 
this small difference was significant, though the effect size was quite small (d=-.09).  
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Limitations. In this study, the only scores compared were mean scores on proctored vs. 
unproctored conditions. Many variables aside from cheating could have affected test 
performance. Furthermore, the researcher was only able to detect effective cheating, and was not 
able to estimate prevalence of cheating or identify possible cheaters. There was also no analysis 
of how cheating effected the validity of the test.  
Nye (2008) 
Eight-hundred and fifty-six European job applicants seeking positions as customer 
service agents for a large international call center in the UK were administered two parallel 
forms of an online speeded attention to detail test. The first time they completed the test they did 
so in an unproctored environment, at a time and place of their own choosing. The second time 
they completed the test, they did so in a proctored setting at the company’s staffing agency.  
After controlling for regression to the mean, participants in the proctored condition 
performed significantly better than those in the unproctored condition, although the effect size 
was small (d=.29). Though, there was no evidence of cheating at the group level, the researchers 
analyzed changes in individual scores to detect likely cheaters, who were defined as individuals 
whose scores changed by more than 1.96 standard deviations between testing conditions.  Of the 
856 applicants in the dataset, only four met this criterion. The researchers therefore concluded 
that cheating was almost nonexistent in this study.  
Limitations. Because there was no control condition that took the test twice under 
proctored conditions, to the researchers estimated and statistically corrected for practice effects 
and regression to the mean. It is impossible to know how accurate the estimate and statistical 
corrections were. Furthermore, the researcher did not manipulate any aspects of the testing 




Though the studies above give us some estimate of the prevalence of cheating, they lack 
the rigorous methodological control available in lab studies. Without a control group for 
comparison, it is difficult to parse out score changes due to the unreliability of measures, practice 
effects, changes in motivation, and regression to the mean from those due to cheating. 
Furthermore, differences in-group means only reflect effective cheaters (i.e., those individuals 
who were able to use cheating to effectively alter their score), not those individuals who cheated 
ineffectively (i.e., without changing their score, or even inadvertently lowering their score).  
Detecting Cheating 
Detecting possible cheaters is a difficult tasking, and proving cheating occurred is often 
an impossible one (Haney & Clark, 2007; Tippins, 2009b). Several methods, however, have been 
developed to estimate the prevalence of cheating and will be adopted into this study. They are 
discussed below.  
Detecting cheating in UIT is important for two reasons. The first is to estimate the 
prevalence of cheating at a group level in order to determine the utility of UIT as a selection 
procedure and estimate the impact of cheating on the validity of the selection system. The second 
is to identify individual cheaters in order to eliminate them from the applicant pool or have them 
complete the selection test under different conditions in order to obtain more accurate scores.  
The first objective is relatively easy to achieve using statistical analyses (Guo & 
Drasgow, 2010; Haney & Clark, 2007). For example, if two groups take the same selection test 
under conditions that manipulate the ease of cheating (e.g., proctored vs. unproctored 
conditions), and the mean score of the group in which cheating is relatively easy is significantly 
higher than that of the group in which cheating is relatively difficult, it is likely that cheating was 
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more prevalent in the condition in which cheating was relatively easy (Arthur, Glaze, Villado, & 
Taylor, 2009; Beaty, Fallon, Shepherd, & Barrett, 2002; Haney & Clark, 2007). Likewise, if the 
same group takes a selection test in an unproctored condition, and then in a proctored condition, 
we would expect the mean score to change very little (assuming high reliability), or even to 
improve upon the second administration (due to practice effects) (Arthur, 2009; Nye, 2008). If 
we see the opposite pattern (the mean score in the proctored condition drops significantly), it is 
likely that cheating occurred in the unproctored condition, and this led to inflation in the mean 
score. If appropriate criteria are available, statistical analyses can also be used to estimate the 
validity of the test (e.g., the correlation between the test and a specific criterion, the factor 
structure of the test, etc.) under different testing conditions. In this case, organizations might not 
only estimate whether cheating occurs and leads to score inflation, but how cheating affects the 
validity of the test (e.g., Beaty et al., 2011).  
Compared to detecting cheating at the group level, detecting individual cheaters in testing 
scenarios is considered to be much more difficult, if not impossible (Haney & Clark, 2007; 
Tippins, 2009b). Statistical procedures can often suggest that cheating occurred within a group, 
but cannot identify individual cheaters. For example, if the mean score of an unproctored 
condition is significantly higher than that of a proctored condition, it suggests that cheating 
occurred in the unproctored condition. However, there is no way to determine with certainty 
which individuals’ scores are accurate, and which individuals’ scores are artificially inflated 
through cheating. Even in a test-retest situation, significant differences in individuals’ scores 
from time one to time two might be reflective of cheating, or they might be reflective of practice 
effects, changes in motivation or personal well-being, or other sources of measurement error 
(Arthur, 2009; Haney & Clark, 2007). Because accusing specific individuals of cheating is 
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associated with potentially life changing consequences, these accusations can make 
organizations vulnerable to civil or even criminal claims, not to mention the various ethical 
implications of doing so (Haney & Clark, 2007; Tippins, 2009b). Organizations, therefore, 
should be extremely confident that an individual cheated before making such an accusation. This 
type of confidence can rarely be achieved through statistical analysis alone.  
The current study will use methods designed to detect cheating at both the group and 
individual level. These methods are described below.  
Group Mean Differences Between Proctored and Unproctored Conditions 
Assuming cheating raises test scores, then comparing the mean score between two 
different testing conditions should be an effective way to detect the presence of cheating, with 
the mean score of the condition with more cheaters being significantly higher than the mean 
score of the condition with fewer cheaters (Beaty, 2011). If we suspect that cheating is more 
common in unproctored settings, then we can compare a proctored and unproctored condition, 
and, if cheating really is more common in the unproctored condition, we would expect to see a 
significantly higher mean score for that condition (see, for example, Arthur, 2009; Beaty, 2011; 
Do, 2005). This technique, however, cannot be used to identify cheating at the individual level 
(Haney & Clark, 2007; Tippins, 2009b).  
In the current study, there will be several conditions in which the participants take the test 
in proctored and unproctored situations, allowing for group mean comparisons across those 
conditions to estimate the impact of cheating at the group level.  
Within Person Differences in Test Performance 
Another way of detecting cheating is to look at within person differences in test 
performance across testing conditions (Haney & Clark, 2007). If candidates score significantly 
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higher in a condition that potentially made cheating easier (e.g., an unproctored condition) than 
in a condition that potentially made cheating more difficult (e.g., a proctored condition), it is 
possible that these candidates cheated (Naglieri et al., 2004; Hense, 2009; Lievens & Burke, 
2011). Though this method allows for the identification of individuals who likely cheated, it is 
problematic in that researchers must decide how much higher the individual must score in the 
condition that potentially made cheating easier in order to be labeled a likely cheater. This 
difference has traditionally been set at three standard deviations (Hartshorne & May, 1928, as 
quoted in Haney & Clark, 2007), though others have used a difference of 1.96 standard 
deviations (see above, Nye, 2008), The second problem with this method is that scores might 
change on the second testing for reasons that have nothing to do with cheating, such as practice 
effects, regression to the mean, or changes in motivation (Nye, 2008).  
In the current study, a number of participants will take a cognitive ability test twice in a 
proctored situation (proctored/ proctored), whereas others will take the test once in an 
unproctored situation, and again in a proctored situation (unproctored/ proctored). This will 
allow the researchers to analyze not only if there are significant within-person score changes 
amongst those participants who took the unproctored test followed by the proctored test, but also 
how those score changes compare to score changes amongst participants who took the proctored 
test twice. This will help eliminate statistical explanations for any score changes.  
Similar Incorrect Answers 
When, despite such a method being prohibited, candidates have the opportunity to work 
with others on the test, similar wrong answers might be indicative of individuals who 
collaborated on the test. This method was famously used by Jacob and Levitt (2002), in part, to 
identify unusual answer strings on standardized tests that indicated that public school teachers 
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had been changing answers on students’ tests to artificially inflate their grades. This method has 
been used in educational settings for quite a long time (e.g., Bird, 1927, as cited in Haney & 
Clark, 2007), and is based on the idea that students should share incorrect answers at a no more 
than chance level (Haney & Clark, 2007). It is important to note that, because some incorrect 
answers are more likely to be chosen than others, baselines for the likelihood of choosing a 
certain incorrect answer should be empirically determined, and not based on theoretical 
distributions (Haney & Clark, 2007).  
In the current study, items with no correct answer will be included on the cognitive 
ability test, and, for half of the participants, access to a prohibited answer key will also be 
provided. The answer key will provide “correct” answers to the unsolvable items. “Correct” 
answers to these items (at a higher level than chance) will be considered evidence of possible 
cheating.  
Self-Report 
One way to discover if a test-taker has cheated is simply to ask. In the current study, 
participants will be guaranteed anonymity, assured that their answer will have no negative 
consequences, and then asked if they cheated on the UIT, and, if so, how.  
The Decision to Cheat 
One question that has been severely under-researched, at least in the organizational 
literature, is why people cheat, and what conditions facilitate or prevent cheating (Tippins, 2006; 
Tippins, 2009b). In Tippins (2006), Fritz Drasgow is quoted as saying, “I think the most pressing 
need is to understand the psychology underlying cheating by job applicants. With a good model, 
practitioners could confidently decide when UIT could be effectively utilized and when cheating 
would be so likely that test scores were meaningless,”  (p. 218). Despite that article being written 
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over seven years ago, however, the research on UIT within the organizational literature has 
remained atheoretical.  
Though cheating on UIT is a relatively new topic, cheating has been studied for decades 
within the educational literature (for examples see Haney & Clark, 2007). Rettinger (2007) 
proposed that cheating is a decision, and that we can understand cheating behavior as a decision 
making process. Based on this perspective, Rettinger then described how utility theory, a well-
established judgment and decision-making theory, can be used to explain test-takers’ decisions to 
cheat.  
Utility Theory 
Utility theory is a judgment and decision making theory that can be used to explain how 
individuals make decisions when they are unsure of outcomes (Rettinger, 2007; for a thorough 
review of judgment and decision making processes, see Weber & Johnson, 2009). In these 
situations, individuals compile a list of possible decisions (e.g., to cheat or not to cheat), and a 
list of possible outcomes (e.g., pass the test, fail the test, get caught cheating). Individuals then 
assign a subjective value to each possible outcome (e.g., how much is it worth to do well on this 
test? What are the consequences of being caught cheating?), and then estimate the probability of 
each outcome occurring (e.g., there’s a 10% chance I’ll be caught cheating). They then multiply 
the subjective value of an outcome by the probability of its occurrence, and this product is 
referred to as the “expected utility” of the outcome. Individuals then sum the expected utilities 
for each possible decision, yielding the “expected value,” and choose the decision with the 
highest expected value.  
An example might be useful to clarify the application of utility theory to cheating. John, 
who lives in Los Angeles, is trying to choose between driving to Mammoth and driving to Tahoe 
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to go skiing for the weekend, with the hope of getting some fresh powder. He checks the weather 
report and sees there is a 90% of 3” of snow in Mammoth, and a 30% of 12” of snow in Tahoe. 
He begins the decision making process by mentally listing his options, which in this case we will 
restrict to driving to Mammoth or driving to Tahoe. He then compiles a list of possible outcomes 
for each decision. If he drives to Mammoth, it might snow 3”, or it might not snow at all. If he 
drives to Tahoe, it might snow 12”, or it might not snow at all. He then assigns a subjective value 
to each possible outcome, which, for the sake of this example, we will express in dollars. Snow 
in neither Mammoth nor Tahoe are worth equally little to him, say $0; 3” of snow in Mammoth 
is worth $20; and 12” of snow in Tahoe is worth four times as much, $80. Next, he estimates the 
probability of each outcome: the probability of no snow in Mammoth equals 10%; the 
probability of 3” of snow in Mammoth equals 90%. The probability of no snow in Tahoe equals 
70%; the probability of 12” of snow in Tahoe equals 30%. John next multiplies the subjective 
value of each outcome by the probability of its occurrence, yielding the expected utility of that 
outcome, and then adds them together for each decision, yielding the expected value. For 
Mammoth, this is $0 X .10 plus $20 X .90, which equals 1.8. For Tahoe, this is $0 X .7 plus $80 
X .3, which equals 2.4. Because the expected value of driving to Tahoe is higher, John decides to 
drive to Tahoe.  
We can apply the same logic to a candidate completing a UIT. After John’s great 
weekend skiing powder at Tahoe, he decides to apply for a position at a national corporation that 
uses UIT as part of its selection procedure. For simplicity’s sake, we’ll limit John to two options: 
not cheating on the test, or cheating on the test. If he decides not to cheat on the test, he will 
either pass the test (get hired or move on to the next stage of the selection process) or fail the test 
(neither getting hired nor moving on to the next stage of the selection process). If he decides to 
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cheat, there are three possible outcomes: he will pass the test, he will fail the test, or he will get 
caught cheating. John then assigns a subjective value to each of these outcomes. Whether he 
decides to cheat or not, passing the test is probably very valuable to him. For the sake of the 
example, let us say it is worth $10,000 (the increase in salary over his current job). Whether he 
cheats or not, failing the test is worth very little to him, say $0. Being caught cheating might 
prevent him from applying to the same company in the future, so it actually represents a cost to 
John, say -$1,000. John then assigns a likelihood to each possible outcome; that is, he estimates 
his probability of passing and failing the test with and without cheating, and the probability of 
being caught cheating. He estimates that his probability of passing the test without cheating is .7, 
and failing the test without cheating is .3. He then estimates his probability of passing the test 
with cheating is .8, failing the test with cheating .1, and being caught cheating .1. John next 
multiplies the subjective value of each outcome by the probability of its occurrence, yielding the 
expected utility of that outcome, and adds them together for each decision, yielding the expected 
value. For the decision not to cheat, this is $0 X .3 plus $10,000 X .70, which equals 7,000. For 
the decision to cheat, this would be $0 X .1 plus $10,000 X .8 plus -$1,000 X .1, which equals 
7,900. Because the expected value of cheating is higher, John decides to cheat on the test.  
Utility theory supports several hypotheses concerning cheating behavior, listed below: 
Hypothesis 1a: Group mean scores on a cognitive ability test will be significantly higher 
in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with 
cheating is high, compared to conditions in which it is low.  
Hypothesis 1b: A significantly greater proportion of participants will self-report cheating 
behavior in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the 
test with cheating is high, compared to conditions in which it is low.  
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Hypothesis 1c: Participants in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of passing the test with cheating is high will answer significantly more of the 
fake cognitive ability items (CAT) items correctly on the first version of the cognitive 
ability test, compared to participants in conditions in which it is low.  
Hypothesis 1d: A significantly greater proportion of participants will score high enough 
on the CAT during session one to be excused from the vigilance task in conditions in 
which the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating is 
high, compared to conditions in which it is low.  
Hypothesis 2a: Group mean scores on a cognitive ability test will be significantly higher 
in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught 
cheating is low, compared to conditions in which it is high.  
Hypothesis 2b: A significantly greater proportion of participants will self-report cheating 
behavior in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of being 
caught cheating is low, compared to conditions in which it is high.  
Hypothesis 2c: Participants in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating is low will answer significantly more of the fake 
CAT items correctly on the first version of the cognitive ability test, compared to 
participants in conditions in which it is high.  
Hypothesis 2d: A significantly greater proportion of participants will score high enough 
on the CAT during session one to be excused from the vigilance task in conditions in 
which the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating is low, 
compared to conditions in which it is high.  
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Hypothesis 3a: Group mean scores on a cognitive ability test will be significantly higher 
in conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating is low, compared to 
conditions in which it is high.  
Hypothesis 3b: A significantly greater proportion of participants will self-report cheating 
behavior in conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating is low, 
compared to conditions in which it is high.  
Hypothesis 3c: Participants in conditions in which the subjective value of being caught 
cheating is low will answer significantly more of the fake CAT items correctly on the 
first version of the cognitive ability test, compared to participants in conditions in which 
it is high.  
Hypothesis 3d: A significantly greater proportion of participants will score high enough 
on the CAT during session one to be excused from the vigilance task in conditions in 
which the subjective value of being caught cheating is low, compared to conditions in 
which it is high.  
Hypothesis 4a: The average CAT score for self-reported cheaters will be significantly 
higher than the average CAT score for participants who do not self-report cheating 
behavior.  
Hypothesis 4b: A significantly greater proportion of self-reported cheaters will “pass” the 
CAT (i.e., score high enough to be excused from the vigilance task).  
Hypothesis 4c: Self-reported cheaters will answer significantly more of the fake CAT 
items “correctly” than participants who did not self-report cheating behavior.  
Hypothesis 5a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between CAT 
performance during session 1 and CAT performance during session 2.  
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Hypothesis 5b: The relationship between CAT performance during session 1 and CAT 
performance during session 2 will be moderated by experimental condition, such that the 
relationship will be stronger in conditions that discourage cheating (i.e., when the 
probability of passing the test with cheating is low, when the probability of being caught 
cheating is high, and when the value of being caught cheating is high) and weaker in 
conditions that encourage cheating (i.e., when the probability of passing the test with 
cheating is high, when the probability of being caught cheating is low, and when the 
value of being caught cheating is low).  
Hypothesis 5c: The relationship between CAT score during session 1 and CAT score 
during session 2 will be moderated by self-reported cheating behavior, such that the 
relationship will be weaker for those who self-reported cheating, and stronger for those 
who did not.  
Hypothesis 6a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between CAT score 
during session one and self-reported SAT score.  
Hypothesis 6b: The relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported 
SAT score will be moderated by experimental condition, such that the relationship will be 
stronger in conditions that discourage cheating (i.e., when the probability of passing the 
test with cheating is low, when the probability of being caught cheating is high, and when 
the value of being caught cheating is high) and weaker in conditions that encourage 
cheating (i.e., when the probability of passing the test with cheating is low, when the 
probability of being caught cheating is low, and when the value of being caught cheating 
is low).  
23 
 
Hypothesis 6c: The relationship between CAT score during session 1 and self-reported 
SAT score will be moderated by self-reported cheating behavior, such that the 
relationship will be weaker for those who self-reported cheating, and stronger for those 
who did not.  
Hypothesis 7a: There will be a significant, positive relationship between CAT score 
during session 1 and self-reported ACT score.  
Hypothesis 7b: The relationship between CAT score during session 1 and self-reported 
ACT score will be moderated by experimental condition, such that the relationship will 
be stronger in conditions that discourage cheating (i.e., when the probability of passing 
the test with cheating is low, when the probability of being caught cheating is high, and 
when the value of being caught cheating is high) and weaker in conditions that encourage 
cheating (i.e., when the probability of passing the test with cheating is high, when the 
probability of being caught cheating is low, and when the value of being caught cheating 
is low).  
Hypothesis 7c: The relationship between CAT score during session 1 and self-reported 
ACT score will be moderated by self-reported cheating behavior, such that the 
relationship will be weaker for those who self-reported cheating, and stronger for those 
who did not.  
Limitations of Utility Theory 
  A major drawback of utility theory is that it assumes humans are perfectly rational and 
perfectly accurate computational machines, when, actually, irrational information (such as 
emotion) often plays a major role in human decision making processes (Weber & Johnson, 
2009). Despite this limitation, however, utility theory has been demonstrated as a relatively 
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accurate heuristic to anticipate and explain people’s decisions (Weber & Johnson, 2009). 
Rational decision-making, via utility theory is thus the focus of the current investigation, not 
emotion. Emotion will be measured, however, and, if necessary, statistically controlled.  
Conclusion 
UIT represents an area of organizational psychology where practice is far outpacing 
research. There is a split between practitioners who embrace the benefits of UIT, and researchers 
who are wary of its drawbacks (Tippins, 2006). Both groups agree that new technologies provide 
a tremendous opportunity for testing and selection, but that this opportunity comes with a 
corresponding need for the ethical and professional use of these technologies, and a need for our 
science to better understand their impact (Naglieri et al., 2004).  
In many ways, the biggest problem for UIT is a lack of empirical data. Beaty (2011), for 
example, noted that, “ There are literally no published studies, as far as we know, that present 
data showing what happens to the predictive validity of a test when it is taken offsite, via the 
Internet, and administered to job applicants,” (pp. 1-2). Similarly, Tippins (2009b), lamented, 
“There is little if anything in the literature that indicates the extent of cheating on employment 
tests,” (p. 69). Without this empirical data, and a theory to guide research and practice, both 
scientists and practitioners lack the knowledge and a framework to know how and when to best 
utilize UIT (Tippins, 2006).  
Contributions of the Current Study 
The current study attempts to fill some of the gaps in the UIT literature by proposing and 
testing a model that explains how candidates decide to cheat on UIT, estimating the prevalence 
of cheating under various testing conditions, estimating the impact of cheating on test validity, 
and testing methods for detecting cheating at both the individual and group levels. Though high-
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quality field research has been conducted on this topic, these studies lacked the precise control 
available in lab experiments, another contribution of the current study.  
Proposing and Testing a Model that Explains How Candidates Decide to Cheat on UIT 
One of the greatest limitations of the literature on UIT is that it lacks a cohesive model to 
guide research and application (Tippins, 2006). Little is understood about the psychology of the 
testing process, including why candidates decide to cheat, or not to cheat (Beaty, 2011; Tippins, 
2006). The current study will address that limitation by proposing and testing utility theory as a 
model to understand candidates’ cheating decisions.  
Estimate the Prevalence of Cheating under Various Testing Conditions 
The potential for cheating behavior represents one of the greatest challenges to the full-
scale implementation of UIT. It is assumed that cheating is widespread, and that cheating on 
unproctored tests is more common than on proctored tests (Tippins, 2009b; Tippins, 2006), 
however, there is virtually no empirical data on the prevalence of cheating on UIT, or what 
conditions encourage or discourage cheating (Beaty, 2011; Tippins, 2009b; Tippins, 2006). The 
current study will address this limitation by estimating the prevalence of cheating under various 
proctored and unproctored conditions.  
Estimating the Impact of Cheating on Validity 
Cheating is a concern in UIT primarily because it might affect test validity and hence the 
utility of decisions made with test scores (Tippins, 2006; Tippins, 2009; Beaty, 2011; Lievens & 
Burke, 2011). Despite this concern, there is very little research on the impact of cheating on test 
validity in UIT (Beaty, 2011). The current study will not only investigate the prevalence of 




Test Methods for Detecting Cheating at Both Group and Individual Level.  
Several methods exist for detecting cheating at both the individual and group levels 
(Haney & Clark, 2007). The current study will provide estimates of the effectiveness of these 
methods, taking advantage of controlled laboratory conditions that allow the researcher to be 
more confident in the claims that cheating has occurred (e.g., the use of an answer sheet with the 
answers to impossible questions and self-report confessions of cheating).  
Benefits of a Lab Study 
Though providing invaluable information about UIT under real-use conditions, field 
studies are limited in study design and sample size and lack control measures (Beaty, 2011). In 
field studies, it is impossible to determine whether or not score changes reflect cheating, or 
whether they reflect changes in motivation, practice effects, or statistical artifacts such as the 
unreliability of the measure or regression to the mean (Nye, 2008). The current study will 
address these challenges by investigating cheating using rigorous scientific methodology, 
including the presence of a control condition, manipulation of pertinent variables, and 




Participants and Procedure 
Participants. Sample 1 consisted of 384 college-aged students recruited through the 
participant pool at Colorado State University. These were students enrolled in PSY100 who must 
complete six research credit hours as part of their final grades. Of 174 participants reporting 
gender, 124 (71.3%) identified as female.  
Sample 2 consisted of 518 workers recruited through Amazon’s mTurk. mTurk 
participants were all recruited from the United States. 337 (65.1%) identified as female, and the 
average age was 37.2 years old (sd=12.6). The directions that mTurk workers were given can be 
found in Appendix A.  
Materials 
Cognitive ability test. The Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) is a highly valid test of 
cognitive ability (Frey & Detterman, 2004; Sackett & Borneman, 2008). The SAT correlates 
highly with college GPA (Sackett & Borneman, 2008), as well as general cognitive ability (Frey 
& Detterman, 2004). General cognitive ability, in turn, is a strong predictor of job performance 
across jobs (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004).  
Previously administered versions of the SAT are publically available. For this study, 
these versions were collected and combined into two similar, 30-minute test versions. These 
versions were then uploaded to the survey site Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Participants were 
presented with the first version of the test during the first session of the study, and the second 




Answer key. In half the conditions, participants were shown the correct answer to each 
question after they had answered it. The testing interface included a back button, allowing 
participants to go back and change their answers once they had been shown the correct answer, 
facilitating cheating.  
Fake questions. Several altered questions were added to the cognitive ability test. These 
questions were similar in appearance to the other questions, but none or all of the answer choices 
were correct. The answer key, however, had a single “correct” answers to these questions.  
Self-report SAT/ ACT score. It is likely that participants who are confident that they 
can pass the test without cheating (i.e., higher ability participants) will be less likely to cheat. 
Self-reported SAT/ ACT score has been shown to be relatively accurate compared to actual SAT/ 
ACT score (Mayer, 2006), and SAT/ ACT scores themselves are a valid and reliable proxy 
measure for general intelligence (Frey & Detterman, 2004; Sackett, 2008).  Therefore, 
participants were asked to provide this information, which in turn were used as criteria against 
which to compare the validity of CAT scores as estimates of cognitive ability across the various 
experimental conditions, and between self-reported cheaters and non-self-reported cheaters.  
Vigilance task. A version of a psychomotor vigilance task was used in this study. In this 
task, participants were asked to stare at a black background upon which, every 30-45 seconds, a 
small, red dot appeared (Dinges & Powell, 1985). When participants saw the red dot, they were 
required to press a button on their keyboard to acknowledge it.  
This task was specifically designed to be monotonous and unpleasant to perform for long 
periods of time. There is evidence supporting performance on this task as a valid and reliable 
measure of vigilance (Loh, Lamond, Dorrian, Roach & Dawson, 2004; Wilkinson & Houghton, 
1982), however performance on this task was not an outcome of importance for this study; 
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rather, the threat of having to complete this monotonous, unpleasant task served to increase the 
value of performing well on the cognitive ability test. Participants were told that if they 
performed well enough on the cognitive ability test, they would be excused from the 
psychomotor vigilance task. If they performed poorly, however, they would have to complete the 
unpleasant task for 35 minutes.  
Suspicion of ulterior motive for the study survey. A survey was designed to detect 
participant suspicion of an ulterior motive for the study (as compared to the vigilance task cover 
story). 
Self-report survey of cheating behavior. Towards the end of the study, once 
participants were debriefed as to the true purpose of the experiment and assured that their 
answers were completely confidential, and that they would not be punished for their behavior, 
participants were asked several questions about their cheating behavior during the study.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same for both samples unless otherwise noted.  
Session 1: Online survey. Participants were told they were participating in a study 
designed to test performance on an online vigilance task. The majority of participants were 
provided a link to the study, and allowed to take it at a time and place of their own choosing, 
before a certain deadline. After following the link, they were asked to complete an online 
consent form. A smaller subset of participants was asked to sign up for a convenient time to take 
the test in a proctored computer lab on campus. They were required to verify their identification, 
and then assigned a computer on which to complete the study.  
Next, participants were told that the study was designed to test performance on an online 
vigilance task. The vigilance task was described, and then participants were asked to perform the 
30 
 
task for eight minutes in order to familiarize themselves with it. The true purpose of this practice 
session was to show participants how boring the vigilance task was.  
Participants were then told that the researchers were only interested in individuals within 
a certain cognitive ability range. Thus, participants were asked to complete a cognitive ability 
test before they competed the vigilance task. Participants were told that those who performed 
above a certain minimum score on the CAT were excused from having to perform the vigilance 
task, but those who failed to achieve the minimum score had to perform the vigilance task for an 
additional 35 minutes. Participants’ cumulative scores were noted at the top of the page for each 
question, as well as the minimum score needed to be excused from the vigilance task. This 
essentially served as an added encouragement for participants to cheat; if participants knew they 
were not going to pass without cheating, they would theoretically be more likely to decide to 
cheat. As noted above, participants in half the conditions were shown the correct answer to the 
questions and given the opportunity to go back and change them.  
Participants were then warned against cheating, and told of the procedures in place to 
detect cheaters, and the punishment that cheaters would face if caught.  
After completing the CAT, participants who scored above the minimum were excused 
from the rest of the study; those who scored below it were required to complete the vigilance 
task. All participants were then told they were randomly selected to retake the test in a proctored 
computer lab on campus, and asked to sign-up for a convenient time and date to do so.  
Session 2: Proctored exam. All participants from sample one were asked to come into a 
proctored computer lab in order to complete the second part of the study (participants from 
sample 2 only completed the first session of the study). Participants were assigned a computer 
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and given a link to the second part of the study. They were reminded of the instructions for the 
CAT, and then administered the alternate version of the CAT.   
After completing the CAT, participants were asked several questions concerning whether 
they suspected the study was about something other than a vigilance task, and when they began 
to suspect this. The true purpose of the study (i.e., to investigate cheating on unproctored, online 
tests) was revealed to participants, and they were asked whether or not they cheated on the exam, 
and, if so, what method they used.  
Participants were then thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their time. They were 
reminded that the study was ongoing, and asked not to share their research experience with any 
other students.  
Manipulations 
According to utility theory, participants’ decisions to cheat or not should be based on sum 
of the values of outcomes of not cheating (i.e., passing/ failing the test) or cheating (passing/ 
failing/ getting caught), as well as the probabilities of each of those outcomes. Thus, in this 
experiment, the value of passing/ failing the test, the probability of passing/ failing the test 
without cheating, and probability of being caught cheating were manipulated.  
Subjective value of passing/ failing the test. The value of passing/ failing the test for 
participants in sample one was the same across conditions. Participants were told that if they 
achieved a minimum score they would be excused from the rest of the experiment, but if they 
failed, they would need to perform the vigilance task for 35 minutes. Time is a valuable 
commodity for most people, and saving time is often cited as one motivation for student cheating 
(e.g., Rettinger, 2007).  
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Subjective evaluation of the likelihood of passing/failing the test without cheating. 
Participants’ subjective evaluation of the probability of passing/ failing the test was not directly 
manipulated. It is likely, however, that high ability students would consider themselves more 
likely to pass the test, and low ability students would consider themselves more likely to fail. 
Therefore, self-reported SAT/ ACT score was measured.  
Subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating. 
Participants’ subjective evaluation of the probability of passing with cheating was manipulated 
by providing access to an answer key in the “high probability of passing the test with cheating,” 
condition, which essentially ensured a 100% chance of passing the test by cheating (i.e., using 
the answer key).  Participants in the “low probability of passing the test with cheating” condition 
were not provided with an answer key. It is important to note that it is impossible to determine 
the exact probability of passing-by-cheating for students in the “low probability of passing the 
test with cheating,” condition, who could potentially use other methods of cheating (e.g., using a 
test surrogate, searching the Internet for answers, etc.). In any case, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the probability of passing by cheating for these participants is substantially lower 
than for participants provided the answer key. It is also worth noting that it would require more 
effort to cheat, which, all else being equal, means that these participants would be less likely to 
seek out other cheating strategies.  
Subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating. For sample one, 
participants’ subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating was manipulated 
in two ways.  
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First, participants in the “proctored” condition were required to take the test in a 
proctored computer lab on campus. The presence of proctors increased the probability that they 
would be caught cheating, as compared to taking the test in an unproctored environment.  
Second, all participants were told that a certain percentage of participants would be 
randomly selected to take another version of the test in a proctored environment to validate their 
scores and detect cheaters. There were two “probability of being caught cheating,” conditions: 
high and low. In the “high probability of being caught cheating” condition, participants were told 
that 90% of participants would be randomly selected to take another version of the test in a 
proctored environment. In the “low probability of being caught cheating,” condition participants 
were told that 10% of participants would be randomly selected to take another version of the test 
in a proctored environment.  
This deception also provided the researchers with an excuse to ask all participants to 
attend the second experimental session in a proctored computer lab on campus.  
For sample two, the probability of getting caught cheating was manipulated by telling 
participants that a certain percentage of responses (again, 10% or 90%) would be analyzed for 
suspicious cheating activity.  
Subjective value of being caught cheating. For sample one, participants’ subjective 
evaluation of the value of being caught cheating was directly manipulated by stating a 
punishment for being caught cheating. In the “high subjective value of being caught cheating” 
condition, participants were told that, if they were caught cheating, they would forfeit all of their 
research credits for the semester and not be allowed to complete any more. Research credits 
represent a large portion of participants’ PSY100 grades, so this punishment was designed to be 
particularly severe. Participants in the “low subjective value of being caught cheating condition” 
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were told that, if they were caught cheating, they would be asked to retake the CAT; this was 
designed to be a relatively lenient punishment.  
For sample two, participants’ subjective evaluation of the value of being caught cheating 
was directly manipulated by stating that, if caught cheating, they would not be paid (“high value 
of being caught cheating” condition), or that they would have to retake the cognitive ability test 




Two samples were collected for analysis in this study. Descriptive statistics for each 
sample are reported below.  
Student Sample Descriptives 
 384 individuals participated in the study from the student sample. Of those reporting 
gender, 124 (71.3%) identified as female, whereas 50 (28.7%) identified as male. The average 
self-reported SAT score was 66.4% (sd=0.1; n=91), and the average self-reported ACT score 
was 25.1 (sd=3.5; n=318). Participants achieved an average score of 21 (out of 35 possible; 
sd=1.1, n=384) on the cognitive ability test (CAT) during session one (KR20=.853), and 20.4 
(sd=5.8, n=244) during session two (KR20=.820). 62 participants (16.1%) performed well 
enough on the CAT during session one to be excused from the vigilance task. See Tables 1 and 2 
for descriptive statistics and frequencies, respectively. See Table 3 for a correlation matrix of key 
variables.  
 Of 238 student participants with data, only 10 (4.2%) suspected the study was about 
cheating. 37 participants of 237 with data self-reported cheating behavior (15.6%). These results 
suggest that the study protocol was successful at obscuring the true purpose of the study and 
providing opportunities for participants to cheat if they so desired in the student sample (see 
Table 2).  
mTurk Descriptives 
518 individuals in the United States between the ages of 18 and 76 (m=37.3, sd=12.6) 
participated in the online mTurk survey. 387 (65.1%) of these individuals identified as female. 
The average self-reported SAT score was 75.5%, (sd=0.2, n=197) and the average self-reported 
ACT score was 26.8 (sd=5.8, n=154) (SAT was converted into a percentage to account for 
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scoring changes that occurred in 2005). ACT had unacceptable levels of skew (skew=-1.7, 
se=0.2) and kurtosis (kurtosis=4.7, se=0.4). Standardized ACT scores were computed, six 
outliers (participants with standardized scores with an absolute value greater than three) were 
identified, and their scores were removed from the sample. This resolved the skew and kurtosis 
problems, resulting in a mean ACT score of 27.3 (sd=4.7, n=151). Participants achieved an 
average score of 23.9 (out of 35 possible; sd=5.6) on the cognitive ability test (CAT), which 
showed adequate reliability (KR20=.842, 35 items). Seven participants (1.4%) performed well 
enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task. See Tables 4 and 5 for descriptive 
statistics and frequencies, respectively, and Table 6 for a correlation matrix of key variables.  
 Deception was an integral part of this study. To test whether the deception was 
successful, participants were asked prior to debriefing whether they suspected the study was 
about something other than cognitive ability and vigilance (which was used as a cover story). Of 
518 participants, only five (1.0%) suspected the study was about cheating. Another important 
aspect of the study is whether or not participants really would cheat, and/or admit it; 56 
participants (10.8%) self-reported cheating behavior. These results suggest that the study 
protocol was successful at obscuring the true purpose of the study and providing opportunities 
for participants to cheat if they so desired (see Table 5).  
Sample comparisons 
Several t-tests and chi-squared tests were used to compare the two samples on key 
variables. First, I compared the samples on mean ACT score, mean SAT score, mean CAT score, 
and the number of fake items answered correctly. One of the assumptions associated with t-tests 
is that the dependent variable is normally distributed. To test this assumption, I requested 
histograms of each of the above variables. All of the variables, with the exception of the number 
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of fake items answered correctly, approximated a normal distribution, supporting this 
assumption, so all variables were compared using t-tests, except for number of fake items 
answered correctly, which was analyzed using a Mann-Whitney U test. Homogeneity of variance 
results are reported with each variable.  
First I compared the samples on ACT mean scores. Levene’s test of homogeneity of 
variance was significant for this variable, F(1, 467)=15.383, p<.001, so equal variances were not 
assumed. The t-test revealed that the mTurk sample self-reported significantly higher ACT 
scores (n=151, m=27.3, sd=4.7) compared to the student sample (n=318, m=25.1, sd=3.5), 
t(233.676)=5.593, p<.001, d=0.531 (see Table 7).  
Next I compared the samples on SAT mean scores. Levene’s test of homogeneity of 
variance was only marginally significant for this variable, F(1, 286)=3.396, p=.066, so the t-test 
proceeded as normal. The t-test revealed that the mTurk sample self-reported significantly higher 
SAT scores (n=197, m=75.5%, sd=0.2) compared to the student sample (n=91, m=66.4%, sd=.1), 
t(286)=4.315, p<.001, d=0.577 (see Table 7).  
Next I compared the samples on CAT mean scores. Levene’s test of homogeneity of 
variance was significant for this variable, F(1, 900)=16.535, p<.001, so equal variances were not 
assumed. The t-test revealed that the mTurk sample performed significantly higher on the CAT 
(n=518, m=23.8, sd=5.6) compared to the student sample (n=384, m=21, sd=6.5), 
t(749.224)=6.770, p<.001, d=0.478 (see Table 7).  
Next I compared the samples on the number of fake items answered correctly using a 
Mann-Whitney U test. The mTurk sample (n=518, mean rank=326.625) answered significantly 
fewer fake items correctly than the student sample (n=384, mean rank=619.951), U=34771.000, 
p<.001, Wendt’s r=.650 (see Table 8).  
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I then compared the samples on dichotomous variables using a series of chi-square tests. I 
first compared the number of participants in each sample who, prior to debriefing, suspected the 
true purpose of the study was to investigate cheating behavior. In total, prior to debriefing, 15 of 
680 participants (2.2%) suspected the true purpose of the study was to investigate cheating 
behavior. Prior to debriefing, five of 518 participants (1%) in the mTurk sample suspected the 
true purpose of the study was to investigate cheating behavior, compared to 10 of 162 
participants (6.1%) in the student sample. This difference was statistically significant, 
Χ2(1)=15.514, p<.001, ϕ=.151 (see Table 9), more participants from the student sample than the 
mTurk sample suspected the true purpose of the study.  
Next I compared the number of participants in each sample who performed well enough 
on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task. In total 69 of 902 participants (7.7%) 
performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task. Seven of 518 
participants (1.4%) in the mTurk sample performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from 
the vigilance task, compared to 62 of 384 participants (16.2%) in the student sample. This 
difference was statistically significant, Χ2(1)=68.324, p<.001, ϕ=.275 (see Table 10).  
Finally, I compared the number of participants in each sample who self-reported cheating 
behavior. In total 86 of 680 participants (12.7%) self-reported cheating behavior. 56 of 518 
participants (10.9%) in the mTurk sample self-reported cheating behavior, compared to 30 of 
162 participants (18.5%) in the student sample. This difference was statistically significant, 
Χ2(1)=6.636, p=.010, ϕ=.099 (see Table 11).  
Because the two samples came from different populations, and significantly differed on 





Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a: Mean difference in CAT score depending on 
experimental condition. I used a 2x2x2 ANCOVA to test hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a (i.e., mean 
differences in CAT score depending on experimental condition) in the student sample. 
ANCOVA requires that several assumptions be met, which were tested prior to running the 
analyses. To test for normality of errors, I requested descriptive statistics, as well as 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistics, of the residuals for each group in the model. 
None of the skew or kurtosis statistics for any of the groups were larger than twice the standard 
error term, and none of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Shapiro-Wilk statistics were significant, 
suggesting that the residuals were normally distributed. Likewise, normality plots supported the 
assumption of normality of errors. A histogram suggested that the dependent variable (i.e., CAT 
score) was normally distributed. Self-reported ACT score was significantly related to CAT score, 
and thus was retained as a covariate; SATper was not. CAT score was plotted against self-
reported ACT score, and results suggested that a linear relationship did exist, supporting the 
assumption of linearity of regression. I checked for an interaction between each of the 
independent variables and standardized test scores to test the assumption of homogeneity of 
regression; this interaction was not significant, supporting the assumption. Finally, I assessed 
homogeneity of variance by requesting Levene’s test of equality of error variances. Results 
indicated a significant difference in the error variance of the dependent variable across groups: 
F(7, 285)=4.856, p<.001. ANCOVA, however, is robust to violations of this assumption, 
especially when the group sizes are approximately even (as they are in this case), and when the 
dependent variable is normally distributed within each group, which histograms of CAT within 
each group revealed to be the case; thus, I continued with the ANCOVA.  
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 The ANCOVA model as a whole explained a significant amount of variance in CAT 
score: F(8, 284)=11.344, p<.001 (see Table 12). The factor representing the subjective 
evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating was significant: F(1, 284)=11.303, 
p<.001, η2=.030. The estimated marginal mean for conditions in which the subjective evaluation 
of the probability of passing the test with cheating was high was 20.480 (se=0.462; see Table 
13), compared to 22.788 conditions in which it was low (se=.504). So although the factor was 
significant, it was significant in the wrong direction, and no evidence was found to support 
hypothesis 1a, that participants would perform better on the CAT in conditions in which the 
probability of passing the test with cheating was high, compared to conditions in which it was 
low.  
The factor representing the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught 
cheating was not significant: F(1, 284)=.0.519, p=.472, η2=.001. Thus, I failed to reject the null 
hypothesis for hypothesis 2a, indicating that (controlling for ACT) group mean scores on the 
CAT did not significantly differ in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating was low (estimated marginal mean=21.9, se=0.5), 
compared to conditions in which it was high (estimated marginal mean=21.4, se=.5; see Table 
13).  
Finally, the factor representing the subjective value of being caught cheating was not 
significant: F(1, 284)=.006, p=.937, η2<.001. Thus, I failed to reject the null hypothesis for 
hypothesis 3a, indicating that (controlling for ACT) group mean scores on the CAT did not 
significantly differ in conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating was low 
(estimated marginal mean=21.7, se=0.5), compared to conditions in which it was high (estimated 
marginal mean=21.6, se=0.5; see Table 13).  
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 The interaction between the probability of passing the test with cheating and probability 
of being caught cheating was non-significant: F(1, 284)=0.336, p=.563, η2=.001, as was the 
interaction between the probability of passing the test with cheating and the value of being 
caught cheating: F(1, 284)=0.318, p=.574, η2=.001, and the interaction between the probability 
of being caught cheating and the value of being caught cheating: F(1, 284)=0.188, p=.665, 
η2<.001. Finally, the three-way interaction between the probability of passing the test with 
cheating, the probability of being caught cheating, and the value of being caught cheating, was 
non-significant: F(1, 284)=0.647, p=.422, η2=.002.  
 Results of this analysis suggest that, although, the subjective evaluation of the probability 
of being caught cheating and the subjective value of being caught cheating did not significantly 
affect CAT score at the group level, the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the 
test with cheating did, although in the wrong direction. Thus, no evidence was found to support 
hypotheses 1a, 2a or 3a in the student sample.  
mTurk Sample 
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a: Mean difference in CAT score depending on  
experimental condition. I used a 2x2x2 ANCOVA to test hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a (i.e., mean 
differences in CAT score depending on experimental condition) for the mTurk sample. Analysis 
of the residuals revealed the presence of six outliers that resulted in unacceptable levels of skew 
and kurtosis, as well as significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistics, of the 
residuals for several of the experimental conditions. After the removal of these outliers, none of 
the skew or kurtosis statistics for any of the groups were larger than twice the standard error 
term, and none of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Shapiro-Wilk statistics were significant, 
suggesting that the residuals were normally distributed. 
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Likewise, normality plots supported the assumption of normality of errors. A histogram 
suggested that the dependent variable (i.e., CAT score) was normally distributed. ACT was 
significantly related to CAT score, and thus was retained as a covariate; SAT score was not, and 
thus was dropped. CAT score was plotted against self-reported ACT scores, and results 
suggested that a linear relationship did exist, supporting the assumption of linearity of regression. 
I checked for an interaction between each of the independent variables and self-reported ACT 
score to test the assumption of homogeneity of regression; this interaction was not significant, 
supporting the assumption. Finally, I assessed homogeneity of variance by requesting Levene’s 
test of equality of error variances. Results indicated no significant difference in the error variance 
of the dependent variable across groups: F(7,137)=1.872, p=.079. Because these assumptions 
were met, I proceeded with the ANCOVA analysis.  
 The ANCOVA model as a whole explain a significant amount of variance in CAT score: 
F(8, 136)=19.841, p<.001 (see Table 14). The factor representing the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of passing the test with cheating was significant: F(1, 136)=19.639, p<.001, η2=.073. 
Thus, the data supported hypothesis 1a, indicating that (controlling for ACT) group mean scores 
on the CAT significantly differed in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of passing the test with cheating was high (estimated marginal mean=26.2, se=0.5; 
see Table 15), compared to conditions in which it was low (estimated marginal mean=23.5, 
se=0.4).   
The factor representing the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught 
cheating was not significant: F(1, 136)=.652, p=.421, η2=.002. Thus, I failed to reject the null 
hypothesis for hypothesis 2a, indicating that (controlling for ACT) group mean scores on the 
CAT did not significantly differ in conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the 
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probability of being caught cheating was low (estimated marginal mean=24.6, se=0.4), 
compared to conditions in which it was high (estimated marginal mean=25.1, se=.4; see Table 
15).  
Finally, the factor representing the subjective value of being caught cheating was not 
significant: F(1, 136)=1.679, p=.197, η2=.006. Thus, I failed to reject the null hypothesis for 
hypothesis 3a, indicating that (controlling for ACT) group mean scores on the CAT did not 
significantly differ in conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating was low 
(estimated marginal mean=25.3, se=0.4), compared to conditions in which it was high (estimated 
marginal mean=24.5, se=0.4; see Table 15).  
 The interaction between the probability of passing the test with cheating and probability 
of being caught cheating was non-significant: F(1,136)=0.001, p=.982, η2<.001, as was the 
interaction between the probability of passing the test with cheating and the value of being 
caught cheating: F(1, 136)=0.723, p=.397, η2=.003. The interaction between the probability of 
being caught cheating and the value of being caught cheating, however, was significant: F(1, 
136)=4.157, p=.043, η2=.015. To probe the interaction, six pairwise comparisons were made 
comparing each of the four possible combinations of high/ low probability of being caught 
cheating and high/ low value of being caught cheating, using a Bonferroni correction for 
experimentwise error rate. Results revealed that the only significant difference was between 
conditions low in both probability of being caught cheating and value of being caught cheating 
and conditions low in probability of being caught cheating but high in value of being caught 
cheating (mean difference=2.973, se=0.861, p=.004, d=3.453). See Table 16 for group means 
and standard errors, and Table 17 for results of all of the comparisons. Finally, the three-way 
interaction between the probability of passing the test with cheating, the probability of being 
44 
 
caught cheating, and the value of being caught cheating, was non-significant: F(1, 136)=0.164, 
p=.686, η2=.001.  
 Results of this analysis suggest that, although, the subjective evaluation of the probability 
of being caught cheating and the subjective value of being caught cheating did not significantly 
affect CAT score at the group level, the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the 
test with cheating did, providing support for hypothesis 1a, but not for hypotheses 2a or 3a in the 
mTurk sample.  
Student Sample 
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b: Proportion of self-reported cheaters by experimental 
condition. In the student sample, I tested hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b using two different sets of 
statistical analyses. First, a chi-square test of independence was use to compare the proportion of 
self-reported cheaters across all eight experimental conditions. In total, 31 of 185 (16.8%) of 
participants self-reported cheating. The results of this analysis revealed no significant difference 
in self-reported cheating across the eight conditions, Χ2(8)=10.834, p=.211, ϕc=.185 (see Table 
18).  
Next, I split the data by the three experimental manipulations (i.e., high/ low probability 
of passing the test with cheating; high/ low probability of being caught cheating; high/ low value 
of being caught cheating) and compared the proportion of participants within each manipulation 
who self-reported cheating behavior. Alpha level was again corrected for experimentwise error 
rate by dividing alpha by the number of tests, yielding a corrected alpha of .017 (i.e., .05/3).  
In conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with 
cheating was low, 11 of 91 participants (12.1%) self-reported cheating behavior, compared to 20 
of 94 participants (21.3%) in conditions in which it was high. This difference was non-
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significant, Χ2(1)=2.799, p=.094, ϕ=.123, providing no evidence in support of hypothesis 1b: 
participants were not significantly more likely to self-report cheating behavior in conditions in 
which the probability of passing the test with cheating was high, compared to those conditions in 
which the probability of passing the test with cheating was low (see Table 19) 
 In conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught 
cheating was low, 9 of 84 participants (10.7%) self-reported cheating behavior, compared to 22 
of 101 (21.8%) in conditions in which it was high. This difference was significant at the .05 
level, Χ2(1)=4.027, p=.045, ϕ=.148, but not at the more stringent .017 level. Thus, I was unable 
to reject the null hypothesis, and no evidence was found in support of hypothesis 2b, that 
participants were more likely to self-report cheating behavior in conditions in which the 
probability of being caught cheating was low, compared to conditions in which the probability of 
being caught cheating was high (see Table 20).  
 In conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating was low, 16 of 92 
participants (17.4%) self-reported cheating behavior, compared to 15 of 93 (16.1%) in conditions 
in which it was high. This difference was not significant, Χ2(1)=0.053, p=.818, ϕ=-.017. Thus, I 
were unable to reject the null hypothesis, and no evidence was found in support of hypothesis 3b, 
that participants were more likely to self-report cheating behavior in conditions in which the 
subjective value of being caught cheating was low, compared to conditions in which it was high 
(see Table 21).  
 From these results, it seems that none of the manipulated factors had an impact on self-
reported cheating behavior in this sample, and no evidence was found to support hypotheses 1b, 





Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b: Proportion of self-reported cheaters by experimental 
condition. In the mTurk sample, I tested hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b using two different sets of 
statistical analyses. First, a chi-square test of independence was use to compare the proportion of 
self-reported cheaters across all eight experimental conditions. In total, 56 of 518 (10.8%) of 
participants self-reported cheating. The results of this analysis revealed no significant difference 
in self-reported cheating across the eight conditions, Χ2(7)=2.833, p=.900, ϕc =.074 (see Table 
22).  
Next, I split the data by the three experimental manipulations (i.e., high/ low probability 
of passing the test with cheating; high/ low probability of being caught cheating; high/ low value 
of being caught cheating) and compared the proportion of participants within each manipulation 
who self-reported cheating behavior. Alpha level was corrected for experimentwise error rate by 
dividing alpha by the number of tests, yielding a corrected alpha of .017 (i.e., .05/3).  
In conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with 
cheating was low, 29 of 286 participants (10.1%) self-reported cheating behavior, compared to 
27 of 232 participants (11.6%) in conditions in which it was high. This difference was non-
significant, Χ2(1)=0.298, p=.585, ϕ=.024, providing no evidence in support of hypothesis 1b: 
participants were not significantly more likely to self-report cheating behavior in conditions in 
which the probability of passing the test with cheating was high, compared to those conditions in 
which the probability of passing the test with cheating was low (see Table 23).  
 In conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught 
cheating was low, 27 of 256 participants (10.6%) self-reported cheating behavior, compared to 
29 of 262 (11.1%) in conditions in which it was high. This difference was not significant, 
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Χ2(1)=0.037, p=.848, ϕ=.008 Thus, I was unable to reject the null hypothesis, and no evidence 
was found in support of hypothesis 2b, that participants were more likely to self-report cheating 
behavior in conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low, compared to 
conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was high (see Table 24).  
 In conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating was low, 27 of 255 
participants (10.6%) self-reported cheating behavior, compared to 29 of 263 (11.0%) in 
conditions in which it was high. This difference was not significant, Χ2(1)=0.026, p=.872, 
ϕ=.007. Thus, I was unable to reject the null hypothesis, and no evidence was found in support of 
hypothesis 3b, that participants were more likely to self-report cheating behavior in conditions in 
which the subjective value of being caught cheating was low, compared to conditions in which it 
was high (see Table 25).  
 From these results, it seems that none of the manipulated factors had an impact on self-
reported cheating behavior in this sample, and no evidence was found to support hypotheses 1b, 
2b, or 3b.  
Student Sample 
Hypothesis 1c, 2c, and 3c: The number of fake items that participants answer 
correctly will differ depending on experimental condition. In the student sample, the variable 
representing the number of fake items that participants answered correctly had neither 
unacceptable skew (skew=0.346, se=0.125) nor unacceptable kurtosis (kurtosis=-0.367, 
se=0.248). I attempted to use parametric tests with this variable, but the residuals of these models 
were invariably skewed (as with the mTurk sample- see below), and showed patterns with the 
predicted values that violated assumptions of independence of errors and normality. 
Consequently, for all analyses involving the number of fake items that participants answered 
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correctly, nonparametric tests were used. These tests are essentially equivalent to standard 
analyses, without the assumption of normality for the dependent variable.  
 I first used a Kruskal-Wallis test to compare the number of fake items answered correctly 
across the eight experimental conditions. Results revealed no significant differences across the 
groups, H(7)=6.424, p=.491 (see Table 26).  
 Next, I compared the number of fake items answered correctly within each experimental 
manipulation individually using Mann-Whitney U tests. Alpha level was corrected for 
experimentwise error rate by dividing alpha by the number of tests, yielding a corrected alpha of 
.017 (i.e., .05/3).  
 There was no significant difference in number of fake items answered correctly between 
conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was low (n=195) compared 
to conditions in which it was high (n=189), U=16703, p=.100, Wendt’s r=.094 (see Table 27); 
nor between conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low (n=191) 
compared to conditions in which it was high (n=193), U=18424.5, p=.995, Wendt’s r=.000 (see 
Table 28); nor between conditions in which the value of being caught cheating was low (n=196) 
compared to conditions in which it was high (n=188), U=18415.500, p=.994, Wendt’s r=.000 
(see Table 29).  
 The number of fake items that participants answered correctly did not significantly differ 








Hypothesis 1c, 2c, and 3c: The number of fake items that participants answer 
correctly will differ depending on experimental condition. In the mTurk sample, the number 
of fake items that participants answered correctly was extremely skewed (skew=1.792, se=0.107) 
and had high kurtosis (kurtosis=4.901, se=0.214). Because the items were fake, and impossible 
to answer correctly except by chance or through accessing the answer key, it makes sense that 
most participants would answer most of these items incorrectly, which was the case (m=0.8, 
sd=0.9), leading to the problems with skew and kurtosis. Several transformations of the original 
variable were attempted, none of which, however, were able to approximate a normal 
distribution. Consequently, for all analyses involving the number of fake items that participants 
answered correctly, nonparametric tests were used. These tests are essentially equivalent to 
standard analyses, without the assumption of normality for the dependent variable.  
 I first used a Kruskal-Wallis test to compare the number of fake items answered correctly 
across the eight experimental conditions. Results revealed no significant differences across the 
groups, H(7)=6.955, p=.434 (see Table 30).  
 Next, I compared the number of fake items answered correctly within each experimental 
manipulation individually using Mann-Whitney U tests. Alpha level was corrected for 
experimentwise error rate by dividing alpha by the number of tests, yielding a corrected alpha of 
.017 (i.e., .05/3).  
 There was no significant difference in number of fake items answered correctly between 
conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was low (n=286) compared 
to conditions in which it was high (n=232), U=30530, p=.089, Wendt’s r=.080 (see Table 31); 
nor between conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low (n=256) 
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compared to conditions in which it was high (n=252), U=33501, p=.982, Wendt’s r=.001 (see 
Table 32); nor between conditions in which the value of being caught cheating was low (n=255) 
compared to conditions in which it was high (n=263), U=32829, p=.653, Wendt’s r=.021  (see 
Table 33).  
 The number of fake items that participants answered correctly did not significantly differ 
by experimental condition, providing no support for hypotheses 1c, 2c, or 3c in the student 
sample.  
Student Sample 
Hypotheses 1d, 2d, and 3d: Proportion of participants who performed well enough 
on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task by experimental condition. In the student 
sample, I tested hypotheses 1d, 2d, and 3d using two different sets of statistical analyses. First, a 
chi-square test of independence was use to compare the proportion of self-reported cheaters 
across all eight experimental conditions. In total, 62 of 384 (16.2%) of participants performed 
well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task. The results of this analysis 
revealed no significant difference in self-reported cheating across the eight conditions, 
Χ2(8)=7.480, p=.486, ϕc=.074 (see Table 34).  
Next, I split the data by the three experimental manipulations (i.e., high/ low probability 
of passing the test with cheating; high/ low probability of being caught cheating; high/ low value 
of being caught cheating) and compared the proportion of participants within each manipulation 
who performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task. Alpha level was 
corrected for experimentwise error rate by dividing alpha by the number of tests, yielding a 
corrected alpha of .017 (i.e., .05/3).  
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In conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with 
cheating was low, 25 of 195 participants (12.8%) performed well enough on the CAT to be 
excused from the vigilance task, compared to 37 of 189 participants (19.6%) in conditions in 
which it was high. This difference was non-significant, Χ2(1)=3.236, p=.072, ϕ=.092, providing 
no evidence in support of hypothesis 1d: participants were not significantly more likely to 
performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task in conditions in which 
the probability of passing the test with cheating was high, compared to those conditions in which 
the probability of passing the test with cheating was low (see Table 35).  
 In conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught 
cheating was low, 32 of 191 participants (16.8%) performed well enough on the CAT to be 
excused from the vigilance task, compared to 30 of 193 (15.5%) in conditions in which it was 
high. This difference was not significant, Χ2(1)=0.104, p=.747, ϕ=-.016. Thus, I was unable to 
reject the null hypothesis, and no evidence was found in support of hypothesis 2d, that 
participants were more likely to performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task in conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low, compared 
to conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was high (see Table 36).  
 In conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating was low, 34 of 196 
participants (17.4%) performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task, 
compared to 28 of 188 (14.9%) in conditions in which it was high. This difference was not 
significant, Χ2(1)=0.427, p=.514, ϕ=-.033. Thus, I was unable to reject the null hypothesis, and 
no evidence was found in support of hypothesis 3d, that participants were more likely to 
performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task in conditions in which 
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the subjective value of being caught cheating was low, compared to conditions in which it was 
high (see Table 37).  
 From these results, it seems that none of the manipulated factors had an impact on 
whether participants performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task in 
this sample, and no evidence was found to support hypotheses 1d, 2d, or 3d in the student 
sample.  
mTurk Sample 
Hypotheses 1d, 2d, and 3d: Proportion of participants in each condition who 
performed well on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task. In the mTurk sample, I 
tested hypotheses 1d, 2d, and 3d using two different sets of statistical analyses. First, I attempted 
to use a chi-square test of independence to compare the proportion of self-reported cheaters 
across all eight experimental conditions. However, for each of the experimental conditions, less 
than five individuals were predicted to occupy each cell, violating one of the key assumptions for 
chi-square. Thus, this analysis was not run and I moved on to the next set of analyses.  
 I split the data by the three experimental manipulations (i.e., high/ low probability of 
passing the test with cheating; high/ low probability of being caught cheating; high/ low value of 
being caught cheating) and compared the proportion of participants within each manipulation 
who self-reported cheating behavior. Alpha level was corrected again for experimentwise error 
rate by dividing alpha by the number of tests, yielding a corrected alpha of .017 (i.e., .05/3).  
Because of the small number of predicted members in each cell, I used a Fisher’s exact 
test in lieu of a chi-square test of independence to test hypotheses 1d, 2d, and 3d (i.e., to compare 
the proportion of participants in each condition who performed well enough on the CAT to be 
excused from the vigilance task).   
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 In total, only seven of 518 participants (1.4%) performed well enough on the CAT to be 
excused from the vigilance portion of the study. In conditions in which the subjective evaluation 
of the probability of passing the test with cheating was low, one of 286 participants (0.4%) 
performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task, compared to six of 
232 participants (2.6%) in conditions in which it was high. This difference was significant at the 
.05 level, but not at the more stringent .017 level, with Fisher’s exact test yielding a significance 
level of p=.049, OR=0.210. Thus, I found no evidence in support of hypothesis 1d, that 
participants were more likely to perform well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task in conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was high, 
compared to those conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was low 
(see Table 38). 
 In conditions in which the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught 
cheating was low, four of 256 participants (1.6%) performed well enough on the CAT to be 
excused from the vigilance task, compared to three of 262 (1.2%) in conditions in which it was 
high. This difference yielded a Fisher’s exact significance of p=.722, OR=1.297. Thus, I were 
unable to reject the null hypothesis, and no evidence was found in support of hypothesis 2d, that 
participants were more likely to perform well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task in conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low, compared 
to conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was high (see Table 39).  
 In conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating was low, three of 
255 participants (1.2%) performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance 
task, compared to four of 263 (1.5%) in conditions in which it was high. This difference was not 
significant, yielding a Fisher’s exact significance of p=1.000, OR=0.730. Thus, I was unable to 
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reject the null hypothesis, and no evidence was found in support of hypothesis 3d, that 
participants were more likely to perform well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task in conditions in which the subjective value of being caught cheating was low, 
compared to conditions in which it was high (see Table 40).  
 From these results, I concluded that none of the factors manipulated in this study 
influenced the probability of participants performing well enough on the CAT to be excused 
from the vigilance task in the mTurk sample.  
Student Sample 
Hypothesis 4a: Self-reported cheaters will perform significantly better on the CAT 
compared to participants who did not self-report cheating behavior. In the student sample, a 
t-test was used to test hypothesis 4a (i.e., participants who self-reported cheating behavior will 
perform significantly better on the CAT than those who did not self-report cheating behavior). 
To test the assumption that the dependent variable is normally distributed, I requested a 
histogram of participants’ performance on the CAT; the histogram approximated a normal 
distribution, supporting this assumption. Levene’s test for equality of variances was non-
significant, F(1, 183)=0.393, p=.531, meaning that the variances did not significantly differ 
between the two groups.  
The t-test revealed that although participants’ who self-reported cheating behavior 
performed better on the CAT (n=31, m=23.1, sd=6.6) compared to those who did not self-report 
cheating behavior (n=154, m=20.9, sd=6.1), this difference was not significant, t(183)=-1.808, 
p=.072, d=0.346 (see Table 41). Thus, no evidence was found to support hypothesis 4a, that 
participants who self-reported cheating behavior performed significantly better on the CAT than 




Hypothesis 4a: Self-reported cheaters will perform significantly better on the CAT 
compared to participants who did not self-report cheating behavior. In the mTurk sample, a 
t-test was used to test hypothesis 4a (i.e., participants who self-reported cheating behavior will 
perform significantly better on the CAT than those who did not self-report cheating behavior). 
The histogram of participants’ performance on the CAT approximated a normal distribution, and 
Levene’s test for equality of variances was non-significant, F(1,516)=1.675, p=.196, meaning 
that the variances did not significantly differ between the two groups.  
The t-test revealed that although participants’ who self-reported cheating behavior 
performed better on the CAT (n=56, m=24.5, sd=6.2) compared to those who did not self-report 
cheating behavior (n=462, m=23.8, sd=5.5), this difference was not significant, t(516)=-0.876, 
p=.382, d=0.119 (see Table 42). Thus, no evidence was found to support hypothesis 4a, that 
participants who self-reported cheating behavior performed significantly better on the CAT than 
those who did not self-report cheating behavior in the mTurk sample.  
Student Sample 
Hypothesis 4b: Proportion of self-reported cheaters who perform well enough on 
the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task, compared to participants who did not self-
report cheating behavior. Hypothesis 4b stated that a greater proportion of individuals who 
self-reported cheating would perform well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance 
task. I used a chi-square test of independence to test this hypothesis in the student sample.  
 In total, 29 of 185 (16.2%) participants performed well enough on the CAT to be excused 
from the vigilance task. Of participants who self-reported cheating behavior, nine of 31 (14.9%) 
performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task, compared to 20 of 154 
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(17.4%) of those who did not self-report cheating behavior. This difference was statistically 
significant, Χ2(1)=5.026, p=.025, ϕ=.165 (see Table 43), however in the opposite direction as 
hypothesized.  
mTurk Sample 
Hypothesis 4b: Proportion of self-reported cheaters who perform well enough on 
the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task, compared to participants who did not self-
report cheating behavior. Hypothesis 4b stated that a greater proportion of individuals who 
self-reported cheating would perform well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance 
task. Because of the small number of predicted members in each cell in the mTurk sample, I used 
a Fisher’s exact test in lieu of a chi-square test of independence.  
 In total, seven of 518 (1.4%) participants performed well enough on the CAT to be 
excused from the vigilance task. Of participants who self-reported cheating behavior, four of 56 
(7.1%) performed well enough on the CAT to be excused form the vigilance task, compared to 
three of 462 (6.5%) of those who did not self-report cheating behavior. This difference was 
statistically significant, yielding a Fisher’s exact significance of p=.003, OR=6.620 (see Table 
44), providing support for hypothesis 4b: participants who self-reported cheating behavior were 
significantly more likely to perform well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance 
task, compared to those who did not self-report cheating behavior in the mTurk sample.  
Student Sample 
Hypothesis 4c: Self-reported cheaters will answer a greater number of fake items 
correctly, compared to participants who did not self-report cheating behavior. Due to the 
previously discussed issues with the variable representing the number of fake items answered 
correctly in the student sample, a Mann-Whitney U analysis was used to test hypothesis 4c, that 
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self-reported cheaters would answer a greater number of fake items correctly than participants 
who did not self-report cheating behavior. Results of the analysis suggested that participants who 
self-reported cheating (n=31) did not answer significantly more of the fake items correctly than 
participants who did not self-report cheating (n=154), U=1880, p=.053, Wendt’s r=.212  (see 
Table 45). Thus, I found no evidence in support of hypothesis 4c in the student sample.  
mTurk Sample 
Hypothesis 4c: Self-reported cheaters will answer a greater number of fake items 
correctly, compared to participants who did not self-report cheating behavior. Due to the 
previously discussed issues with the variable representing the number of fake items answered 
correctly in the mTurk sample, a Mann-Whitney U analysis was used to test hypothesis 4c, that 
self-reported cheaters would answer a greater number of fake items correctly than participants 
who did not self-report cheating behavior. Results of the analysis suggested that participants who 
self-reported cheating (n=31) did not answer significantly more of the fake items correctly than 
participants who did not self-report cheating (n=154), U=1880, p=.053, Wendt’s r=.055 (see 
Table 46). Thus, I found no evidence in support of hypothesis 4c in the mTurk sample.  
Student Sample 
Hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c: CAT score during session one will be significantly, 
positively related to CAT score during session 2; this relationship will be moderated by 
experimental condition and by self-reported cheating behavior. I used linear regression to 
test hypotheses 5a, (i.e., that participants’ CAT score during session one would be significantly 
related to participants’ CAT score during session two) and 5b (i.e., that experimental condition 
would moderate the relationship between participants’ CAT scores during session one and 
session two).  
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To test hypotheses 5a, I used simple linear regression (SLR). One of the assumptions 
associated with SLR is that a linear relationship exists between Y and X. A scatter-plot 
confirmed that a linear relationship appeared to be an appropriate fit for the data. Another 
assumption associated with SLR is that the residuals of the model are normally distributed. After 
the model was run, the residuals were saved and plotted on a histogram; the histogram 
approximated a normal distribution, confirming this assumption. Another assumption associated 
with SLR is homoscedasticity. To check this assumption, residuals were plotted against the 
predictor variable (i.e., CAT score during session one). The plot revealed no detectable pattern, 
confirming this assumption. Because all of the assumptions were met, I proceeded with the SLR 
analysis.  
CAT score during session one explained a significant amount of variance in CAT score 
during session two, R=.719, R2=.517, F(1, 192)=205.480, p<.001. Participants’ CAT during 
session one significantly predicted participants’ CAT score during session two (b=.655, 
se=0.046, p<.001, β=0.719). Thus, I was able to reject the null hypothesis, providing evidence 
for hypothesis 5a (see Table 47).  
To test hypothesis 5b, I used multiple linear regression (MLR). One of the assumptions of 
MLR is that the residuals are normally distributed; to test this assumption, I requested a 
histogram and p-plot of the residuals, both of which provided evidence in support of the 
assumption of normality. Another assumption of MLR is homogeneity of variance; to test this 
assumption, the predicted values were plotted against the unstandardized residuals. The scatter 
plot revealed no pattern, supporting the assumption of homogeneity of variance. Because all of 
the assumptions were met, I proceeded with the MLR analysis.  
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To test for main effects of experimental condition on participants’ CAT score during 
session two, dummy coded variables representing each of the four experimental factors (i.e., the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating, the subjective 
evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating, the subjective value of being caught 
cheating, proctored/ unproctored) were added to the model along with participants’ CAT score 
during session one. A “1” on the dummy coded variables represents the higher version of the 
variable (e.g., high subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating) 
whereas a “0” on the dummy coded variables represents the lower version of the variable (e.g., a 
low subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating). This model was 
also significant, R=.726, R2=.514, F(5, 188)=41.802, p<.001, although the additional amount of 
the variance in CAT score during session two explained by the model was not, ∆R2=.010, ∆F(4, 
188)=0.943, p=.440 (see Table 48).  
In this model, participants’ CAT score during session one continued to significantly 
predict participants’ CAT score during session two, b=0.655, se=0.046, t(188)=14.124, p<.001, 
β=0.719. The dummy coded variable representing the subjective evaluation of the probability of 
passing the test with cheating was non-significant, b=0.863, se=0.594, t(188)=1.452, p=.148, 
β=0.076; participants’ mean scores on the CAT during session two did not significantly differ as 
a function of the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating. The 
dummy coded variable representing the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught 
cheating was non-significant, b=-0.677, se=0.599, t(188)=-1.130, p=.260, β=-0.060; participants’ 
mean scores on the CAT during session two did not significantly differ as a function of the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating. The dummy coded variable 
representing the subjective value of being caught cheating was non-significant, b=-0.493, 
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se=0.588, t(188)=-0.839, p=.403, β=-0.044; participants’ mean scores on the CAT during session 
two did not significantly differ as a function of the subjective value of being caught cheating. 
The dummy coded variable representing the proctored/ unproctored conditions was non-
significant, b=-0.531, se=1.297, t(188)=-0.410, p=.683, β=-0.023; participants’ mean scores on 
the CAT during session two did not significantly differ as a function of the proctored/ 
unproctored conditions. 
Next, interaction terms were created by multiplying each of the four experimental factors 
by participants’ CAT score during session one, and then these terms were added to the model. 
These interaction terms represent the moderating effect of each experimental factor on the 
relationship between participants’ CAT score during session one and participants’ CAT score 
during session two. This model was significant, R=.737, R2=.543, F(9, 184)=24.316, p<.001, but 
the additional amount of variance explained by the interaction terms was not, ∆R2=.017, ∆F(4, 
184)=1.691, p=.154 (see Table 49). The interaction term representing the moderating effect of 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating on the relationship 
between CAT score during session one and CAT score during session two was non-significant, 
b=-0.132, se=0.095, t(184)=-1.393, p=.165, β=-0.262; the relationship between participants’ 
CAT score during session one and participants’ CAT scores during session two was not 
significantly moderated by the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with 
cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score during session one 
and CAT score during session two was non-significant, b=-0.130, se=0.096, t(184)=-1.356, 
p=.177, β=-0.258; the relationship between participants’ CAT scores during session one and 
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participants’ CAT scores during session two was not significantly moderated by the subjective 
evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective value of being 
caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score during session one and CAT score 
during session two was non-significant, b=-0.130, se=0.094, t(188)=-1.378, p=.170, β=-0.260; 
the relationship between participants’ CAT scores during session one and participants’ CAT 
scores during session two was not significantly moderated by the subjective value of being 
caught cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the proctored/ unproctored 
conditions on the relationship between CAT score during session one and CAT score during 
session two was non-significant, b=0.031, se=0.230, t(184)=0.137, p=.892, β=0.028; the 
relationship between participants’ CAT scores during session one and participants’ CAT scores 
during session two was not significantly stronger in the proctored condition, as compared to the 
unproctored condition.  
Results revealed that condition did not moderate the relationship between CAT score 
during session one and CAT score during session two, providing no support for hypothesis 5b.  
 To test hypothesis 5c (i.e., that the relationship between CAT score during session one 
and CAT score during session two will be moderated by self-reported cheating behavior), I 
added a dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating (0=participant did not self-
report cheating; 1=participant did self-report cheating) to the model regressing CAT score during 
session two on CAT score during session one (i.e., hypothesis 5a). The model including the 
dummy coded cheating term was significant, R=.724, R2=.524, F(2, 175)=96.512, p<.001, 
explaining an additional 1.3% of the variance in CAT score during session two, ∆R2=.130, ∆F(1, 
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175)=4.906, p=.028 (see Table 50). Self-reported cheating behavior was a significant predictor 
of CAT score during session two, b=-1.734, se=0.783, t(175)=-2.215, p=.028, β=-0.117; 
participants who self-reported cheating on the CAT during session one scored, on average, 1.734 
points lower on the CAT during session two than participants who did not self-report cheating on 
the CAT during session one.  
 Next, an interaction term was created by multiplying CAT score during session one by 
the dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating behavior, and this term was added 
to the model. This interaction term represented the moderating effect of self-reported cheating 
behavior on the relationship between CAT score during session one and CAT score during 
session two. This model was significant, R=.733, R2=.538, F(3,174)=67.422, p<.001, explaining 
an additional 1.3% of the variance in CAT score during session two, ∆R2=.013, ∆F(1, 
174)=4.919, p=.028 (see Table 51). The term representing the interaction between CAT score 
during session one and self-reported cheating behavior significantly moderated the relationship 
between CAT score during session one and CAT score during session two, b=-0.262, se=0.118, 
t(174)=-2.218, p=.028, β=-0.426, such that the relationship was weaker for participants who self-
reported cheating, compared to those who did not.  
 The results of the above analyses provide evidence in support of hypothesis 5c:  self-
reported cheating behavior significantly moderated the relationship between CAT score during 








Hypotheses 6a, 6b, and 6c: CAT score during session one will be significantly, 
positively related to self-reported SAT score; this relationship will be moderated by 
experimental condition and by self-reported cheating behavior. In the student sample, I used 
linear regression to test hypotheses 6a, (i.e., that participants’ CAT score during session one 
would be significantly related to participants’ self-reported SAT score) and 6b (i.e., that 
experimental condition would moderate the relationship between participants’ CAT scores 
during session one and self-reported ACT score).  
To test hypotheses 6a, I used simple linear regression (SLR). A scatter-plot confirmed 
that a linear relationship appeared to be an appropriate fit for the data. After the model was run, 
the residuals were saved and plotted on a histogram; the histogram approximated a normal 
distribution. Residuals were plotted against the predictor variable (i.e., CAT score during session 
one), and the plot revealed no detectable pattern. Because all of the assumptions were met, I 
proceeded with the SLR analysis.  
CAT score during session one did not explain a significant amount of variance in self-
reported SAT score, R=.189, R2=.036, F(1, 89)=3.293, p=.073. Participants’ CAT during session 
one did not significantly predict participants’ self-reported SAT score, b=0.004, se=0.002, 
t(89)=1.815, p=.073, β=0.189. Thus, I was unable to reject the null hypothesis, providing no 
evidence in support of hypothesis 6a in the student sample (see Table 52).  
To test hypothesis 6b, I used multiple linear regression (MLR). I requested a histogram 
and p-plot of the residuals, both of which provided evidence in support of the assumption of 
normality. The predicted values were plotted against the unstandardized residuals, and the scatter 
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plot revealed no pattern, supporting the assumption of homogeneity of variance. Because all of 
the assumptions were met, I proceeded with the MLR analysis.  
To test for main effects of experimental condition on participants’ self-reported SAT 
score, dummy coded variables representing each of the four experimental factors (i.e., the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating, the subjective 
evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating, the subjective value of being caught 
cheating, proctored/ unproctored) were added to the model along with participants’ CAT score 
during session one. A “1” on the dummy coded variables represents the higher version of the 
variable (e.g., high subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating) 
whereas a “0” on the dummy coded variables represents the lower version of the variable (e.g., a 
low subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating). This model was 
also non-significant, R=.217, R2=.047, F(5, 85)=0.842, p=.524, nor was the additional amount of 
the variance in self-reported SAT score explained by the model, ∆R2=.012, ∆F(4, 85)=0.257, 
p=.905 (see Table 53).  
In this model, participants’ CAT score during session one again failed to significantly 
predict participants’ self-reported SAT score, b=0.004, se=0.002, t(85)=1.777, p=.079, β=0.194. 
The dummy coded variable representing the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing 
the test with cheating was non-significant, b=-0.003, se=0.030, t(85)=-0.097, p=.923, β=-0.011; 
participants’ mean self-reported SAT score did not significantly differ as a function of the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating. The dummy coded 
variable representing the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating was 
non-significant, b=0.010, se=0.030, t(85)=0.331, p=.742, β=0.036; participants’ mean scores on 
the self-reported ACT score did not significantly differ as a function of the subjective evaluation 
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of the probability of being caught cheating. The dummy coded variable representing the 
subjective value of being caught cheating was non-significant, b=0.002, se=0.030, t(85)=0.083, 
p=.934, β=0.009; participants’ mean scores on the self-reported SAT score did not significantly 
differ as a function of the subjective value of being caught cheating. The dummy coded variable 
representing the proctored/ unproctored conditions was non-significant, b=0.072, se=0.076, 
t(85)=0.946, p=.347, β=0.109; participants’ mean scores on the self-reported SAT score did not 
significantly differ as a function of the proctored/ unproctored conditions. 
Next, interaction terms were created by multiplying each of the four experimental factors 
by participants’ CAT score during session one, and then these terms were added to the model. 
These interaction terms represented the moderating effect of each experimental factor on the 
relationship between participants’ CAT score during session one and participants’ self-reported 
SAT score. This model was also non-significant, R=.268, R2=.072, F(9, 81)=0.694, p=.713, as 
was the additional amount of variance explained by the interaction terms, ∆R2=.024, ∆F(4, 
81)=0.532, p=.713 (see Table 54). The interaction term representing the moderating effect of 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating on the relationship 
between CAT score during session one and self-reported SAT score was non-significant, b=-
0.001, se=0.005, t(81)=-0.110, p=.913, β=-0.044; the relationship between participants’ CAT 
score during session one and participants’ self-reported SAT score was not significantly 
moderated by the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score during session one 
and self-reported SAT score was non-significant, b=-0.004, se=0.005, t(81)=-0.870, p=.387, β=-
0.348; the relationship between participants’ CAT scores during session one and participants’ 
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self-reported ACT score was not significantly moderated by the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective value of being 
caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported 
SAT score was non-significant, b=0.002, se=0.005, t(81)=0.519, p=.605, β=0.218; the 
relationship between participants’ CAT scores during session one and participants’ self-reported 
SAT scores was not significantly moderated by the subjective value of being caught cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the proctored/ unproctored 
conditions on the relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported SAT 
score was non-significant, b=0.014, se=0.016, t(81)=0.853, p=.396, β=0.422; the relationship 
between participants’ CAT scores during session one and participants’ self-reported ACT score 
was not significantly stronger in the proctored condition, as compared to the unproctored 
condition.  
Results revealed that condition did not moderate the relationship between CAT score 
during session one and self-reported SAT score, providing no support for hypothesis 6b in the 
student sample.  
 To test hypothesis 6c (i.e., that the relationship between CAT score during session one 
and self-reported SAT score will be moderated by self-reported cheating behavior), I added a 
dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating (0=participant did not self-report 
cheating; 1=participant did self-report cheating) to the model regressing self-reported SAT score 
on CAT score during session one (i.e., hypothesis 6a). The model including the dummy coded 
cheating term was non-significant, R=.298, R2=.089, F(2, 50)=2.442, p=0.097, as was the 
additional variance explained by the model, ∆R2=.033, ∆F(1, 50)=1.812, p=.184 (see Table 55). 
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Self-reported cheating behavior was not a significant predictor of self-reported SAT score, b=-
0.072, se=0.054, t(50)=-1.346, p=.184, β=-0.185.  
 Next, an interaction term was created by multiplying CAT score during session one by 
the dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating behavior, and this term was added 
to the model. This interaction term represented the moderating effect of self-reported cheating 
behavior on the relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported SAT score. 
This model was non-significant, R=.312, R2=.098, F(3, 49)=0.464, p=.499, as was the additional 
amount of the variance in self-reported SAT score explained by the model, ∆R2=.009, ∆F(1, 
49)=.464, p=.499 (see Table 56). The term representing the interaction between CAT score 
during session one and self-reported cheating behavior did not significantly moderate the 
relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported SAT score, b=-0.006, 
se=0.008, t(49)=-0.681, p=.499, β=0.008. 
 The results of the above analyses provide no evidence in support of hypothesis 6c:  self-
reported cheating behavior did not significantly moderate the relationship between CAT score 
during session one and self-reported SAT score in the student sample.  
mTurk Sample 
Hypotheses 6a, 6b, and 6c: CAT score will be significantly, positively related to self-
reported SAT score; this relationship will be moderated by experimental condition and by 
self-reported cheating behavior. In the mTurk sample, I used linear regression to test 
hypotheses 6a, (i.e., that participants’ CAT score would be significantly related to self-reported 
SAT score) and 6b (i.e., that experimental condition would moderate the relationship between 
participants’ CAT scores and self-reported SAT score).  
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To test hypotheses 6a, I again used SLR. A scatter-plot confirmed that a linear 
relationship that a linear relationship existed between Y and X. The plot the residuals of the CAT 
scores on self-reported cheating behavior revealed no detectable pattern, confirming the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. Because all of the assumptions were met, I proceeded with the 
SLR analysis.  
Studentized deleted residuals were calculated for all cases and used to detect outliers. 
Cases with a studentized deleted residual with an absolute value greater than two were removed 
from the analyses. This led to the removal of 17 cases.  
CAT score explained a significant amount of variance in self-reported SAT, R=.269, 
R2=.073, F(1,178)=13.925, p<.001. Participants’ CAT score significantly predicted self-reported 
SAT (b=0.007, se=0.002, p<.001, β=0.269). Thus, I was able reject the null hypothesis, 
providing support for hypothesis 6a in the mTurk sample (see Table 57).  
To test hypothesis 6b, I used multiple linear regression (MLR). I requested a histogram 
and p-plot of the residuals, both of which provided evidence in support of the assumption of 
normality. The predicted values were plotted against the unstandardized residuals, and this 
scatter plot revealed no pattern, supporting the assumption of homogeneity of variance. None of 
the part and partial plots revealed a detectable pattern. Because all of the assumptions were met, I 
proceeded with the MLR analysis.  
To test for main effects of experimental condition on self-reported SAT, dummy coded 
variables representing each of the three experimental factors (i.e., the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of passing the test with cheating, the subjective evaluation of the probability of being 
caught cheating, the subjective value of being caught cheating) were added to the model along 
with participants’ CAT score. A “1” on the dummy coded variables represents the higher version 
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of the variable (e.g., high subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with 
cheating) whereas a “0” on the dummy coded variables represents the lower version of the 
variable (e.g., a low subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating). 
This model was also significant, R=.331, R2=.110, F(4, 175)=5.393, p<.001, however the 
additional amount of variance explained by the experimental conditions was not, ∆R2=.037, 
∆F(3, 175)=2.436, p=.066 (see Table 58).  
In this model, participants’ CAT score again significantly predicted self-reported SAT, 
b=0.008, se=0.002, t(175)=4.115, p<.001, β=0.298. The dummy coded variable representing the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating was also significant, b=-
0.040, se=0.018, t(175)=-2.234, p=.027, β=-0.162; participants in the condition in which the 
subjective likelihood of passing the test with cheating was high self-reported significantly lower 
SAT scores. The dummy coded variable representing the subjective evaluation of the probability 
of being caught cheating was non-significant, b=-0.020, se=0.018, t(175)=-1.133, p=.259, β=-
0.082; self-reported SAT did not significantly differ as a function of the subjective evaluation of 
the probability of being caught cheating. The dummy coded variable representing the subjective 
value of being caught cheating was non-significant, b=0.019, se=0.018, t(175)=1.041, p=.299, 
β=0.075; self-reported SAT did not significantly differ as a function of the subjective value of 
being caught cheating.  
Next, interaction terms were created by multiplying each of the three experimental 
factors by participants’ CAT score, and then these terms were added to the model. These 
interaction terms represent the moderating effect of each experimental factor on the relationship 
between participants’ CAT scores and self-reported SAT. This model was significant, R=.342, 
R2=.117, F(7, 172)=3.244, p=.003, however the additional amount of variance explained by the 
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interaction terms was not, ∆R2=.007, ∆F(3, 172)=0.447, p=.719 (see Table 59). The interaction 
term representing the moderating effect of subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the 
test with cheating on the relationship between CAT score and self-reported SAT was non-
significant, b=0.003, se=0.004, t(172)=0.729, p=.467, β=0.319; the relationship between 
participants’ CAT score  and self-reported SAT was not significantly moderated by the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score and self-reported 
SAT was non-significant, b=-0.001, se=0.004, t(172)=-0.286, p=.775, β=-0.121; the relationship 
between participants’ CAT scores  and self-reported SAT was not significantly moderated by the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective value of being 
caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score and self-reported SAT was non-
significant, b=-0.003, se=.004, t(172)=-0.844, p=.400, β=-0.337; the relationship between 
participants’ CAT scores  and self-reported SAT was not significantly moderated by the 
subjective value of being caught cheating.  
The results suggest that experimental condition did not moderate the relationship between 
CAT score and self-reported SAT score, providing no evidence in support of hypothesis 6b in the 
mTurk sample.  
To test hypothesis 6c (i.e., that the relationship between CAT score and self-reported 
SAT will be moderated by self-reported cheating behavior), I added a dummy coded variable 
representing self-reported cheating (0=participant did not self-report cheating; 1=participant did 
self-report cheating) to the model regressing self-reported SAT on CAT score  (i.e., hypothesis 
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6a). Studentized deleted residuals were calculated for all cases and used to detect outliers. Cases 
with a studentized deleted residual with an absolute value greater than two were removed from 
the analyses. This led to the removal of 15 cases.  
The model including the dummy coded cheating term was significant, R=.281, R2=.079, 
F(2, 179)=7.651, p=.001, explaining an additional 2.1% of the variance in self-reported SAT, 
∆R2=.021, ∆F(1, 179)=4.151 p=.043 (see Table 60). Self-reported cheating behavior was a 
significant predictor of self-reported SAT, b=-0.064, se=0.031, t(179)=-2.038, p=.043, β=-0.146; 
participants who self-reported cheating on the CAT during session reported scoring, on average,-
0.064 points lower on the SAT than participants who did not self-report cheating on the CAT .  
 Next, an interaction term was created by multiplying CAT score by the dummy coded 
variable representing self-reported cheating behavior, and this term was added to the model. This 
interaction term represented the moderating effect of self-reported cheating behavior on the 
relationship between CAT score and self-reported SAT. This model was significant, R=.299, 
R2=.090, F(3, 178)=5.838, p=.001, but the additional amount of variance explained by the 
interaction terms was not, ∆R2=.011, ∆F(1, 178)=2.117, p=.147 (see Table 61). The term 
representing the interaction between CAT score and self-reported cheating behavior did not 
significantly predict self-reported SAT, b=-0.009, se=0.006, t(178)=-1.455, p=.147, β=-0.541.  
 The results of the above analyses provide no evidence in support of hypothesis 6c, that 
self-reported cheating behavior significantly moderated the relationship between CAT score and 







Hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c: CAT score during session one will be significantly, 
positively related to self-reported ACT score; this relationship will be moderated by 
experimental condition and by self-reported cheating behavior. In the student sample, I used 
linear regression to test hypotheses 7a, (i.e., that participants’ CAT score during session one 
would be significantly related to participants’ self-reported ACT score) and 7b (i.e., that 
experimental condition would moderate the relationship between participants’ CAT scores 
during session one and self-reported ACT score).  
To test hypotheses 7a, I used simple linear regression (SLR). A scatter-plot confirmed 
that a linear relationship appeared to be an appropriate fit for the data. After the model was run, 
the residuals were saved and plotted on a histogram; the histogram approximated a normal 
distribution. Another assumption associated with SLR is homoscedasticity. Residuals were 
plotted against the predictor variable (i.e., CAT score during session one). The plot revealed no 
detectable pattern. Because all of the assumptions were met, I proceeded with the SLR analysis.  
CAT score during session one explained a significant amount of variance in self-reported 
ACT score, R=.456, R2=.208, F(1, 316)=83.082, p<.001. Participants’ CAT during session one 
significantly predicted participants’ self-reported ACT score (b=0.244, se=0.027, p<.001, 
β=0.456). Thus, I was able to reject the null hypothesis, providing evidence for hypothesis 7a in 
the student sample (see Table 62).  
To test hypothesis 7b, I used multiple linear regression (MLR). I requested a histogram 
and p-plot of the residuals, both of which provided evidence in support of the assumption of 
normality. Predicted values were plotted against the unstandardized residuals. The scatter plot 
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revealed no pattern, supporting the assumption of homogeneity of variance. Because all of the 
assumptions were met, I proceeded with the MLR analysis.  
To test for main effects of experimental condition on participants’ Self-reported ACT 
score, dummy coded variables representing each of the four experimental factors (i.e., the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating, the subjective 
evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating, the subjective value of being caught 
cheating, proctored/ unproctored) were added to the model along with participants’ CAT score 
during session one. A “1” on the dummy coded variables represents the higher version of the 
variable (e.g., high subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating) 
whereas a “0” on the dummy coded variables represents the lower version of the variable (e.g., a 
low subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating). This model was 
also significant, R=.495, R2=.245, F(5, 312)=20.293, p<.001, as was the additional amount of the 
variance in self-reported ACT score explained by the model, ∆R2=.037, ∆F(4, 312)=3.847, 
p=.005 (see Table 63).  
In this model, participants’ CAT score during session one continued to significantly 
predict participants’ self-reported ACT score, b=0.248, se=0.026, t(312)=9.370, p<.001, 
β=0.464. The dummy coded variable representing the subjective evaluation of the probability of 
passing the test with cheating was also significant, b=1.236, se=0.360, t(312)=3.439, p<.001, 
β=0.176; participants in the condition in which the probability of passing the test with cheating 
reported scoring, on average, 1.236 points higher on the ACT. The dummy coded variable 
representing the subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating was non-
significant, b=-0.323, se=0.358, t(312)=-0.900, p=.369, β=-0.046; participants’ mean scores on 
self-reported ACT did not significantly differ as a function of the subjective evaluation of the 
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probability of being caught cheating. The dummy coded variable representing the subjective 
value of being caught cheating was non-significant, b=-0.355, se=0.359, t(312)=-0.990, p=.323, 
β=-0.051; participants’ mean scores on self-reported ACT did not significantly differ as a 
function of the subjective value of being caught cheating. The dummy coded variable 
representing the proctored/ unproctored conditions was non-significant, b=0.931, se=0.806, 
t(312)=1.156, p=.249, β=0.063; participants’ mean scores on self-reported ACT did not 
significantly differ as a function of the proctored/ unproctored conditions. 
Next, interaction terms were created by multiplying each of the four experimental factors 
by participants’ CAT score during session one, and then these terms were added to the model. 
These interaction terms represent the moderating effect of each experimental factor on the 
relationship between participants’ CAT score during session one and participants’ self-reported 
ACT score. This model was significant, R=.511, R2=.262, F(9, 308)=12.126, p<.001, but the 
additional amount of variance explained by the interaction terms was not, ∆R2=.016, ∆F(4, 
308)=1.692, p=.152 (see Table 64). The interaction term representing the moderating effect of 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating on the relationship 
between CAT score during session one and self-reported ACT score was significant, b=-0.133, 
se=0.056, t(308)=-2.381, p=.018, β=-0.439; the relationship between participants’ CAT score 
during session one and participants’ self-reported ACT was significantly moderated by the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating, such that the 
relationship was weaker for participants in conditions in which the subjective probability of 
passing the test with cheating was high.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score during session one 
75 
 
and self-reported ACT score was non-significant, b=0.035, se=0.054, t(308)=.650, p=.516, 
β=0.114; the relationship between participants’ CAT scores during session one and participants’ 
self-reported ACT scores was not significantly moderated by the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective value of being 
caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported 
ACT score was non-significant, b=-0.052, se=0.055, t(308)=-0.939, p=.348, β=-0.171; the 
relationship between participants’ CAT scores during session one and participants’ self-reported 
ACT score was not significantly moderated by the subjective value of being caught cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the proctored/ unproctored 
conditions on the relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported ACT 
score was non-significant, b=-0.078, se=0.142, t(308)=-0.551, p=.582, β=-0.119 the relationship 
between participants’ CAT scores during session one and participants’ self-reported ACT score 
was not significantly stronger in the proctored condition, as compared to the unproctored 
condition.  
Results revealed that condition did not moderate the relationship between CAT score 
during session one and self-reported ACT score, except for conditions in which the probability of 
passing the test with cheating was high, providing partial support for hypothesis 7b in the student 
sample.  
 To test hypothesis 7c (i.e., that the relationship between CAT score during session one 
and Self-reported ACT score will be moderated by self-reported cheating behavior), I added a 
dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating (0=participant did not self-report 
cheating; 1=participant did self-report cheating) to the model regressing self-reported ACT score 
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on CAT score during session one (i.e., hypothesis 7a). The model including the dummy coded 
cheating term was significant, R=.553, R2=.305, F(2, 151)=33.187, p<.001, explaining an 
additional 7.5% of the variance in self-reported ACT score, ∆R2=.075, ∆F(1, 151)=16.310, 
p<.001 (see Table 65). Self-reported cheating behavior was a significant predictor of self-
reported ACT score, b=-2.512, se=0.622, t(151)=-4.039, p<.001, β=-0.275; participant who self-
reported cheating on the CAT during session one scored, on average, 2.512 points lower on self-
reported ACT than participants who did not self-report cheating on the CAT during session one.  
 Next, an interaction term was created by multiplying CAT score during session one by 
the dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating behavior, and this term was added 
to the model. This interaction term represented the moderating effect of self-reported cheating 
behavior on the relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported ACT score. 
This model was significant, R=.566, R2=.309, F(3, 150)=22.361, p<.001, however the additional  
variance in self-reported ACT score explained by the model was not, ∆R2=.004, ∆F(1, 
150)=0.797, p=.374 (see Table 66). The term representing the interaction between CAT score 
during session one and self-reported cheating behavior did not significantly moderate the 
relationship between CAT score during session one and self-reported ACT score, b=-0.083, 
se=0.093, t(150)=-0.893, p=.374, β=-0.219.  
 The results of the above analyses provide no evidence in support of hypothesis 7c:  self-
reported cheating behavior did not significantly moderate the relationship between CAT score 







Hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c: CAT score will be significantly, positively related to self-
reported ACT; this relationship will be moderated by experimental condition and by self-
reported cheating behavior. In the mTurk sample, I used linear regression to test hypotheses 
7a, (i.e., that participants’ CAT score would be significantly related to self-reported ACT) and 7b 
(i.e., that experimental condition would moderate the relationship between participants’ CAT 
scores and self-reported ACT).  
To test hypotheses 7a, I used simple linear regression (SLR). A scatter-plot confirmed 
that a linear relationship appeared to be an appropriate fit for the data. After the model was run, 
the residuals were saved and plotted on a histogram; the histogram approximated a normal 
distribution. Residuals were plotted against the predictor variable (i.e., CAT score), and the plot 
revealed no detectable pattern. Because all of the assumptions were met, I proceeded with the 
SLR analysis.  
Studentized deleted residuals were calculated for all cases and used to detect outliers. 
Cases with a studentized deleted residual with an absolute value greater than two were removed 
from the analyses. This led to the removal of 7 cases.  
CAT score explained a significant amount of variance in self-reported ACT, R=.669, 
R2=.447, F(1,142)=114.918, p<.001. Participants’ CAT score significantly predicted self-
reported ACT (b=0.595, se=0.056, p<.001, β=0.669). Thus, I was able reject the null hypothesis, 
providing support for hypothesis 7a in the mTurk sample (see Table 67).  
To test hypothesis 7b, I used multiple linear regression (MLR). I requested a histogram 
and p-plot of the residuals, both of which provided evidence in support of the assumption of 
normality. Predicted values were plotted against the unstandardized residuals, and the scatter plot 
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revealed no pattern, supporting the assumption of homogeneity of variance. None of the part and 
partial plots revealed a detectable pattern. Because all of the assumptions were met, I proceeded 
with the MLR analysis.  
To test for main effects of experimental condition on self-reported ACT, dummy coded 
variables representing each of the three experimental factors (i.e., the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of passing the test with cheating, the subjective evaluation of the probability of being 
caught cheating, the subjective value of being caught cheating) were added to the model along 
with participants’ CAT score. A “1” on the dummy coded variables represents the higher version 
of the variable (e.g., high subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with 
cheating) whereas a “0” on the dummy coded variables represents the lower version of the 
variable (e.g., a low subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating). 
This model was also significant, R=.464, R2=.449, F(4, 139)=30.114, p<.001, however the 
additional amount of variance explained by the experimental conditions was not, ∆R2=.017, 
∆F(3, 139)=1.467, p=.226 (see Table 68).  
In this model, participants’ CAT score again significantly predicted self-reported ACT, 
b=0.636, se=0.059, t(139)=10.840, p<.001, β=0.714. The dummy coded variable representing 
the subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating was also significant, 
b=-1.208, se=0.583, t(139)=-2.074, p=.040, β=-0.136; participants in the condition in which the 
subjective likelihood of passing the test with cheating was high self-reported significantly lower 
ACT scores. The dummy coded variable representing the subjective evaluation of the probability 
of being caught cheating was non-significant, b=-0.153, se=0.552, t(139)=-0.278, p=.782, β=-
0.017; self-reported ACT did not significantly differ as a function of the subjective evaluation of 
the probability of being caught cheating. The dummy coded variable representing the subjective 
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value of being caught cheating was non-significant, b=0.094, se=0.554, t(139)=0.170, p=.866, 
β=0.011; self-reported ACT did not significantly differ as a function of the subjective value of 
being caught cheating.  
Next, interaction terms were created by multiplying each of the three experimental 
factors by participants’ CAT score, and then these terms were added to the model. These 
interaction terms represent the moderating effect of each experimental factor on the relationship 
between participants’ CAT score and self-reported ACT. This model was significant, R=.684, 
R2=.468, F(7, 136)=17.104, p<.001, however the additional amount of variance explained by the 
interaction terms was not, ∆R2=.004, ∆F(3, 136)=0.335, p=.800 (see Table 69). The interaction 
term representing the moderating effect of subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the 
test with cheating on the relationship between CAT score and self-reported ACT was non-
significant, b=-0.105, se=0.124, t(136)=-0.853, p=.395, β=-0.324; the relationship between 
participants’ CAT score  and self-reported ACT was not significantly moderated by the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of passing the test with cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective evaluation of the 
probability of being caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score and self-reported 
ACT was non-significant, b=0.002, se=0.117, t(136)=0.019, p=.985, β=0.006; the relationship 
between participants’ CAT scores  and self-reported ACT was not significantly moderated by the 
subjective evaluation of the probability of being caught cheating.  
The interaction term representing the moderating effect of the subjective value of being 
caught cheating on the relationship between CAT score and self-reported ACT was non-
significant, b=0.042, se=0.122, t(136)=0.341, p=.734, β=0.120; the relationship between 
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participants’ CAT scores  and self-reported ACT was not significantly moderated by the 
subjective value of being caught cheating.  
The results suggest that experimental condition did not moderate the relationship between 
CAT score and self-reported ACT, providing no evidence in support of hypothesis 7b in the 
mTurk sample.  
To test hypothesis 7c (i.e., that the relationship between CAT score and self-reported 
ACT will be moderated by self-reported cheating behavior), I added a dummy coded variable 
representing self-reported cheating (0=participant did not self-report cheating; 1=participant did 
self-report cheating) to the model regressing self-reported ACT on CAT score  (i.e., hypothesis 
7a). Studentized deleted residuals were calculated for all cases and used to detect outliers. Cases 
with a studentized deleted residual with an absolute value greater than two were removed from 
the analyses. This led to the removal of six cases.  
The model including the dummy coded cheating term was significant, R=.662, R2=.438, 
F(2, 142)=55.243, p<.001, explaining no additional variance in self-reported ACT, ∆R2=.000, 
∆F(1, 142)=0.020 p=.888 (see Table 70). Self-reported cheating behavior was not a significant 
predictor of self-reported ACT, b=0.117, se=0.829, t(142)=0.141, p=.888, β=0.009; there was no 
significant difference in self-reported ACT scores between participants who self-reported and did 
not self-report cheating on the CAT.  
 Next, an interaction term was created by multiplying CAT score by the dummy coded 
variable representing self-reported cheating behavior, and this term was added to the model. This 
interaction term represented the moderating effect of self-reported cheating behavior on the 
relationship between CAT score and self-reported ACT. This model was significant, R=.663, 
R2=.440, F(3, 141)=36.872, p<.001, but the additional amount of variance explained by the 
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interaction terms was not, ∆R2=.002, ∆F(1, 141)=0.511, p=.476 (see Table 71). The term 
representing the interaction between CAT score and self-reported cheating behavior did not 
significantly predict self-reported ACT, b=-0.102, se=0.142, t(141)=-0.715, p=.476, β=-0.192.  
 The results of the above analyses provide no evidence in support of hypothesis 7c, that 
self-reported cheating behavior significantly moderated the relationship between CAT score and 





The current study employed an experimental protocol to test the effectiveness of utility 
theory as a framework for understanding the decision making process in regard to cheating on 
online tests. Online testing is an increasingly popular selection tool, but human resource 
managers are rightfully worried about the negative impact that cheating has on the validity and 
utility of their selection systems (Tippins, 2006). The purpose of the current study was to apply a 
theoretical framework to understand cheating behavior, to estimate the prevalence of cheating in 
two different samples, and to estimate the impact of cheating on the validity of an online test.  
This study relied heavily on deception. If participants knew the true purpose of the study 
was to research cheating behavior, that knowledge might have influenced cheating behavior. For 
instance, if participants knew the only reason they were required to take a long, boring vigilance 
task was to encourage them to cheat, and that there was no punishment for cheating, they may 
have been more likely to cheat. Conversely, if participants knew that cheating behavior was 
being investigated, they may have been less likely to cheat because of their own self-image as a 
person that does not cheat, even if there were no direct consequences of being caught. Thus, 
effective deception was vital to the outcome of this study.  
The experimental protocol seemed successful in achieving two goals integral to the study. 
First, only a small percentage of participants were able to guess the true purpose of the study 
prior to debriefing: five of 518 (1.0%) participants in the mTurk sample, and 10 of 162 (6.2%) 
participants in the student sample reported that they believed the study was actually about 
cheating. One possible reason that a significantly greater portion of participants from the student 
sample suspected deception in the study is that these participants were involved in several 
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psychological studies in addition to the current study, and many of them were students in 
Introduction to Psychology, so it is likely that they were more familiar with the methods used in 
psychological research, and the possibility of deception, than participants in the mTurk sample.  
 The experimental protocol was also successful in providing an opportunity to cheat for 
those participants who so desired. In total, 86 of 680 (12.7%) participants self-reported cheating 
behavior. Not everyone who cheated necessarily admitted to it, meaning that 12.7% represents 
the minimum number of individuals who cheated in this sample.  
 The evidence discussed above suggests that the experimental protocol was effective at 
obscuring the true purpose of the study and providing participants with opportunities to cheat. 
Below, we discuss the theoretical and practical contributions of the study, as well as the strengths 
and limitations, and directions for future research.  
Theoretical Contributions 
 One of the main goals of this study was to provide a theoretical framework to help 
understand why some individuals decide to cheat on online tests. The theoretical framework 
chosen for this purpose was utility theory, which, in brief, states that individuals consider the 
probability and value of possible outcomes when making decisions (Rettinger, 2007). In 
accordance with this theory, three experimental factors were manipulated in attempt to influence 
the decision making process: the probability of passing the test with cheating, the probability of 
being caught cheating, and the value of being caught cheating. The results of these manipulations 
are discussed below.  
Although the experimental protocol was effective at creating a scenario in which 
participants were unaware that the true purpose of the study was to investigate cheating and in 
which opportunities for cheating existed, the experimental manipulations were less successful. 
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The only manipulation that was significant across any of the analyses was the probability of 
passing the test with cheating (i.e., providing access to an answer key). In the mTurk sample, 
participants in conditions in which they had access to the answer key scored higher on the CAT, 
on average, than participants in conditions without access to the answer key. The eta-squared for 
the factor representing the probability of passing the test with cheating was .073, considered a 
medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). In the student sample, probability of passing the test with 
cheating moderated the relationship between CAT scores during session one and CAT scores 
during session two, such that the relationship was weaker for participants who had access to the 
answer key. This can be interpreted as evidence that a greater number of participants in those 
conditions cheated, moderating the relationship between the two CAT scores. The standardized 
slope for the interaction term was .579, generally considered to be a large effect size (Cohen, 
1988). These results provided partial support for the appropriateness of the application of utility 
theory to understanding cheating behavior in online testing scenarios.  
 The other experimental manipulations (i.e., the probability of being caught cheating and 
the value of being caught cheating) did not significantly influence CAT score, self-reported 
cheating behavior, or the relationship between CAT score and other measures of cognitive ability 
in either of the samples. There are two potential explanations for this: the application of utility 
theory was correct, but the manipulations were unsuccessful, or the manipulations were 
successful, but utility theory does not provide a useful framework for understanding judgment 
and decision-making in regard to cheating on online tests. Both explanations are discussed 
below.  
At the end of the second session, once the true purpose of the study was revealed to 
participants, participants who reported not having cheated on the exam were asked why they 
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decided not to cheat. Several of the participants in the mTurk sample responded that they were 
worried about not getting paid, or about having their submissions rejected (which negatively 
affects their worker rating on mTurk, and thus their ability to complete subsequent assignments 
and earn money). Although these qualitative data were not formally analyzed, and thus should be 
interpreted with caution, this does imply that at least some of the workers were considering the 
consequences of the decision to cheat, which is in agreement with utility theory. This suggests 
that utility theory may provide a useful framework for understanding judgment and decision-
making in regard to cheating on online tests, but that the experimental manipulations may not 
have been successful at affecting participants perceptions of the probability of passing the test 
with cheating, the probability of being caught cheating, and/ or the value of being caught 
cheating. Perhaps the “low value of being caught cheating” condition (in which participants were 
told that if they were caught cheating they would have to retake the cognitive ability test) 
actually represented a high value to mTurk workers. These workers are paid by the number of 
assignments they complete, and having to invest time in retaking the cognitive ability test would 
have equated to losing the opportunity to complete another assignment and earn pay, which may 
have actually represented a large value to these workers. 
Across both samples, however, several participants cited personal characteristics in their 
explanations for not cheating, including references to integrity and personal beliefs against 
cheating. Utility theory does not take individual beliefs such as these into account when 
describing the judgment and decision making process. If decisions regarding cheating behavior 
are driven mainly by personal beliefs, then perhaps utility theory is not the most appropriate 
framework to understand judgment and decision making in regard to cheating on online tests.  
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I tend to agree with both interpretations. On the one hand, situational factors, specifically 
access to the answer key, did affect CAT scores in the expected direction in the mTurk sample. 
This suggests that participants were weighing some aspects of the situation when deciding 
whether or not to cheat. It is possible then that the other manipulations were simply not effective 
at affecting participants’ perceptions of the likelihood and value of the outcomes of their 
decisions. I think the manipulations may have been based too strongly in the mathematical aspect 
of utility theory. For example, in the “high probability of being caught cheating” condition, 
participants were told there was a 90% chance of being caught cheating, as opposed to 10% in 
the “low probability of being caught cheating” condition. Discussing the possibility of cheating 
at all, however, may have made participants aware that there was a possibility they would be 
caught cheating. A more effective manipulation might have been to emphasize the probability of 
being caught cheating in the “high probability of being caught cheating” condition vs. not 
mention that possibility at all in the “low probability of being caught cheating” condition. The 
percentage chance of being caught cheating may have had little effect compared to merely 
bringing up the chance that participants might be caught cheating.  
On the other hand, even when presented with the answers and the opportunity to use them 
to improve their scores, the majority of participants did not self-report cheating. This implies that 
there is a limit to the percent of variance in cheating behavior that utility theory can explain. 
Cheating decisions might be based much more in individual differences, for example. However, 
from a practical perspective, organizations probably have a limited ability to influence individual 
differences such as moral beliefs before or during online testing. Even if utility theory is capable 
of explaining only a small percentage of the variance in cheating behavior, it might be the most 
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practical framework for organizations to conceive of and design anti-cheating interventions 
during online testing.  
As Tippins (2006; 2009b) noted, within the organizational literature there is little 
research into why people cheat and which conditions facilitate or prevent cheating. Within the 
educational literature, Rettinger (2007) argued that cheating can best be understood as a decision, 
and that a judgment and decision making theory, specifically utility theory, could be helpful in 
understanding cheating behavior. One of the main goals of the current study was, following 
Rettinger, to apply utility theory to understand individuals’ decisions regarding whether to cheat 
in UIT.  
The results of this study add to the literature by highlighting the limitations of utility 
theory, and arguably decision-making theories in general, for understanding cheating behavior. 
The mixed, and largely non-significant findings, of the current study call into question the 
appropriateness of utility theory for understanding cheating decisions in UIT. As discussed 
earlier, one of the reasons may be that individual characteristics, such as personality, have a 
greater influence on cheating decisions than aspects of the environment. Another limitation of 
utility theory often discussed by researchers is that utility theory presents decision-making as a 
non-emotional, mathematical process, although research has shown that emotions have a 
relatively large impact on decision-making processes (e.g., Weber & Johnson, 2009). The results 
of this study can be interpreted as a call to other researchers to understand cheating behavior 
from a more holistic perspective, including not only decision-making processes, but personality 
traits and emotional states.  
As Rettinger (2007) argued, utility theory seems to provide a useful framework for 
understanding cheating behavior. It would also seem to offer a useful framework for 
88 
 
understanding differences between cheating behaviors in proctored and unproctored settings. For 
example, utility theory posits that, all else being equal, when the probability of being caught 
cheating is high, or when the probability of cheating successfully is low, individuals will be less 
likely to cheat. Compared to traditional, proctored tests, UIT implicitly creates a situation where 
participants are less likely to be caught cheating, and more likely to cheat successfully, 
theoretically increasing the likelihood that test-takers will cheat. Although I was not very 
effective at using UIT to manipulate cheating behavior in this study, UIT might still be a useful 
tool for understanding differences in cheating behavior in proctored and unproctored settings. 
Thus, the results of this study can be used to provide direction to practitioners comparing the 
benefits and drawbacks of traditional, proctored testing versus UIT.   
Another limitation regularly discussed in both the educational and organizational 
literatures is detecting cheating (Guo & Drasgow, 2010; Haney & Clark, 2007). The current 
study added to the literature by testing several methods of detecting cheating, though largely at 
the group level. In line with previous research in both the educational and organizational 
literature (e.g., Arthur, Glaze, Villado, & Taylor, 2009; Beaty, Fallon, Shepherd, & Barrett, 
2002; Haney & Clark, 2007) mean differences in test scores were found between groups in 
which cheating was easier versus groups in which cheating was harder. Differences were also 
found in validity coefficients for the CAT depending on condition, as well as differences in the 
proportion of self-reported cheaters versus non-self-reported cheaters who “passed” the cognitive 
ability test. The use of mean differences as an indication of cheating is questionable in previous 
research, namely because differences in scores might be due not just to differences in the 
prevalence of cheating, but due to differences in testing conditions, motivation, or practice 
effects (when studies utilize a within-person design; e.g. Do, 2005). This study uniquely 
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contributed to the literature by including a condition in which participants were proctored at both 
times one and two. 
The current research also contributed to the literature by utilizing a novel method for 
detecting cheaters, that is, the use of impossible items that could only be answered correctly 
through guessing or the use of the answer key. Although the analyses which used the fake items 
as an outcome variable were all non-significant, many of them were marginally significant, 
implying that this method might be useful for detecting cheating at the group or individual level.  
Finally, the current study contributed to the literature by providing evidence that self-
reported cheating can provide at least a rough estimate of cheating behavior. Although it is 
impossible to know what percentage of actual cheaters self-reported cheating behavior, 
requesting self-reported cheating behavior was shown to be a useful tool at least for estimating 
minimum rates of cheating within the samples.  
Practical Contributions 
Although two of the theoretical factors that were manipulated did not significantly affect 
cheating behavior in the current study, several practical findings were gleaned from the results.  
Manipulating the probability of passing the test with cheating significantly affected CAT 
scores in the mTurk sample. Though it may seem obvious that providing participants with access 
to an answer key will increase test performance, this situation is analogous to the situation in 
which job candidates complete selection tests online. When taking a test in an unproctored 
situation, job candidates potentially have access to nearly unlimited resources that could provide 
answers to selection tests, such as the Internet, reference books, and knowledgeable 
acquaintances (Tippins, 2006). The results of this study suggest that access to these types of 
resources inflates test scores and undermines test validity, at least with cognitive ability tests 
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(some of the most popular selection instruments; Lievens & Burke, 2011). Other types of tests, 
such as projective tests or personality tests, might be more difficult to cheat on because the 
“correct” answer is less objective, and may be less obvious to test takers.  
Another practical contribution of this study is providing an estimate of the prevalence of 
cheating on online tests in two different samples. In the mTurk sample, 10.8% of participants 
self-reported cheating, and in the student sample, 15.6% of participants self-reported cheating. 
As noted earlier, this is not the percentage of participants that actually cheated, but the 
percentage of participants that admitted cheating, representing a lower end of the prevalence of 
cheating in these samples. Past research has shown that individuals are often unwilling to admit 
to deviant behavior, even when guaranteed anonymity, especially in regard to cheating. For 
example, a study by Erickson and Smith (1974) compared actual cheating behavior (as measured 
through direct observation) to self-reported cheating behavior in a sample of 118 undergraduate 
students. In this study, 10.2% of participants self-reported cheating behavior, whereas 43.2% 
were directly observed cheating; only 23.5% of cheaters admitted to cheating. These results 
imply that cheating may have been substantially underreported in the current study. This is 
supported by the finding that, in the mTurk sample, access to the answer key was significantly 
related to higher CAT scores, whereas access to the answer key was not significantly related to 
self-reported cheating, implying that some participants may have cheated (and inflated their CAT 
scores with the answer key) without reporting it.  
The prevalence of self-reported cheating in this study, especially when interpreted as a 
minimum estimate of the true prevalence of cheating, has important practical implications. Many 
organizations use online selection tests as a first hurdle, and participants who perform well 
enough on these initial tests are then invited to take a shorter form of the test in a proctored 
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situation in order to validate their original scores (Tippins, 2006). The results of this study imply 
that, at least in some samples, the prevalence of cheating is high enough to support the use of 
these validation tests for differentiating true high performers from those job candidates who may 
have cheated.   
Cheating only poses a problem for identifying qualified candidates if cheating is effective 
at falsely inflating test scores. For many of the participants, cheating was effective; self-reported 
cheaters in both samples were significantly more likely to “pass” the cognitive ability test (i.e., 
perform well enough to be excused from the vigilance task, saving 35 minutes of additional 
work). In the student sample, self-reported cheating moderated the relationship between CAT 
performance during session one and CAT performance during session two, analogous to the 
relationship between selection test scores and job performance in selection scenarios. This 
provides evidence that cheating undermines the validity of selection tests, a finding that 
organizations should consider before deciding to use online tests as part of a selection system. 
These results suggest that cheating does occur in online testing situations, and that it poses a 
potential problem for employers searching for the most qualified candidates.  
Another interesting finding is that many of the self-reported cheaters were unsuccessful. 
In both samples, only a small minority of self-reported cheaters actually performed well enough 
on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task (7.1% of self-reported cheaters in the mTurk 
sample; 14.9% in the student sample). Furthermore, in neither condition did self-reported 
cheaters perform significantly better on the CAT, on average, than participants who did not self-
report cheating behavior. In light of the evidence that only a minority of cheaters are actually 
admitting cheating behavior (Ericksom & Smith, 1974), it might be that only ineffective cheaters 
self-reported their cheating behavior. An alternative explination has to do with participants’ 
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motivation to cheat; several participants reported looking up answers to the CAT items because 
they were curious or frustrated, not necessarily to “pass” the CAT. Another explanation is that 
cheating effectively on cognitively ability tests is itself a task that requires high cognitive ability. 
Participants can search the Internet for the definition of words used in an anology, for example, 
but they cannot search the Internet for the relationship between the words. Results of the chi-
square test of independence revealed no significant difference in the number of self-reported 
cheaters across the experimental conditions in either sample. Cheaters in conditions in which the 
answer key was provided may have had an easy time of cheating, but cheaters in conditions 
without access to the answer key may have had to rely on other, less effective cheating strategies 
(e.g., searching the Internet). Perhaps only individuals with higher cognitive ability were able to 
cheat effectively in these conditions.  
Results of an informal analysis support this explanation. The SAT and ACT scores of 
successful mTurk cheaters (i.e., self-reported cheaters who performed well enough on the CAT 
to be excused from the vigilance task) were compared to those of unsuccessful cheaters (i.e., 
self-reported cheaters who failed to perform well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task). If cheating successfully requires higher cognitive ability, we would expect 
successful cheaters to have, on average, higher cognitive ability as compared to unsuccessful 
cheaters. Although the sample size was much too small to yield significant results (e.g., only four 
participants self-reported cheating and performed well enough to be excused from the vigilance 
task in the mTurk sample), the absolute differences on self-reported SAT and ACT between the 
groups were quite large and in the expected direction. In the mTurk sample, the average self-
reported SAT score (expressed as a percentage) was 80.0% for successful cheaters (n=4); for 
unsuccessful cheaters (n=52) it was nearly 10% lower: 71.5%. A similar pattern was found for 
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ACT scores: for successful cheaters, the mean ACT score was 31, compared to 26.6 for 
unsuccessful cheaters. In the student sample, the average self-reported SAT score was slightly 
higher for successful cheaters (m=63.0%, n=4) compared to unsuccessful cheaters (m=62.1%; 
n=3), as was the average self-reported ACT score, m=24.1 for successful cheaters (n=7) and 
m=22.5 for unsuccessful cheaters (n=18). Although underpowered, these results do provide 
evidence of a trend that successful cheaters have higher cognitive ability than unsuccessful 
cheaters, supporting the contention that a certain level of cognitive ability is necessary for 
effective cheating.  
Websites and forums do exist where job candidates share questions and answers from 
selection tests, so there are situations in selection scenarios in which job candidates essentially 
have access to “answer keys,” (Tippins, 2009). For many other selection tests, however, job 
candidates must rely on their own cognitive ability and ingenuity to cheat. Because many of the 
self-reported cheaters failed to perform well enough on the cognitive ability test to be excused 
from the vigilance study, the results of the current study imply that many of these cheating 
strategies are ineffective.  
Strengths 
There were several strengths to this study that represented an improvement over earlier 
research on cheating on online tests.  
One of the major strengths of this study, as compared to earlier studies on cheating on 
online tests, was the amount of control provided by a lab study. Most of the previous research on 
cheating on online tests has been field research (e.g., Arthur, 2009; Do, 2005; Nye, 2008). 
Although these studies are useful for understanding cheating in applied contexts, they lack the 
control available in lab studies. For example, in field research it is usually unethical or 
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impractical to manipulate aspects of the testing situation to make cheating more or less attractive. 
In this study, I manipulated the probability of passing the test with cheating, the likelihood of 
being caught cheating, and the value of being caught cheating in an attempt to change 
participants’ cheating behavior. I was also able to gather self-reports of cheating behavior in a 
situation in which participants were relatively free of fear of reprisal (at least compared to 
employment scenarios). The estimates of cheating in this study were substantially higher than in 
the field studies mentioned above. For example, Arthur (2009) estimated that only 7.77% of 
participants cheated, and Nye (2008) identified only four candidates out of 856 as likely 
cheaters; because thist study provided a relatively safe and anonymous way to self-report 
cheating behavior, the higher percentage of self-reported cheaters in this study may be a more 
accurate estimate of the true prevalence of cheating, though likely still represents an under-
estimation.  
Another benefit of doing this type of research within the context of a lab study is that we 
were able to collect data on self-reported cheating. Most job candidates would probably avoid 
admitting to a potential employer that they cheated on a selection test. Within the context of a 
research study, however, we were able to assure participants of their anonymity and protection. 
Although it is impossible to know what percentage of cheaters actually admitted to cheating in 
this study, the willingness of approximately 13% of the sample to admit to cheating provides 
evidence that at least some participants had faith in the researchers’ assurances of anonymity and 
protection. These data on self-reported cheating allowed us to test theoretically and practically 
significant hypotheses, such as the prevalence of cheating in the samples, which conditions 
affected cheating behavior, how cheating affected performance, and how cheating affected the 
relationship between the unproctored, online CAT and other measures of cognitive ability.  
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Collecting data on several measures of cognitive ability (i.e., self-reported SAT and ACT 
scores, CAT scores in a proctored setting), as well as the presence of a true control condition, 
represent other strengths of this study. One of the main concerns that organizations have about 
cheating is not whether cheating effects mean scores (although this is important), but whether, 
and by how much, cheating affects the validity of tests (Lievens & Burke, 2011).  
Because I collected data on other measures of cognitive ability, we were able to estimate 
the impact of cheating on the relationship between the online cognitive ability test and these 
measures. Furthermore, the presence of a true control condition (i.e., the condition which took 
the test twice under proctored circumstances) provided a benchmark estimate of the relationship 
between the CAT scores during sessions one and two. Test performance can change over time 
for a number of reasons (e.g., differences in versions of the test, changes in participant 
motivation, and practice effects; Nye, 2008). Earlier studies (e.g., Nye, 2008) have relied on 
statistical estimates of regression to the mean and practice effects to correct for these changes, 
which, although useful, may not accurately reflect the influence of these factors on a particular 
sample’s changes in performance.  
Another strength of this study, compared to earlier field studies, is that everyone in the 
student sample who took the initial CAT was retested. Often in field studies, only those 
individuals who perform well enough on the initial selection test to be considered for 
employment are retested, restricting the range of scores available for analysis (e.g., Do, 2005). In 
our study, all participants in the student sample retook the CAT, regardless of their initial 
performance, maintaining a range of scores across both testing sessions.  
 Of course, one of the major criticisms of lab studies is that they are unrealistic, especially 
when they rely on student samples. A situation in which candidates are completing a selection 
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test in order to be considered for employment is fundamentally different from a situation in 
which student participants are completing a test for research credits. To overcome that criticism, 
we tested our study with two samples: a student sample and an mTurk sample. Although an 
mTurk sample is not a perfect analog to a sample of candidates completing selection tests, there 
are similarities. mTurk provides a sample of workers who know they are being evaluated on their 
performance, much as potential job candidates know they are being evaluated by their potential 
employers.  Previous research has shown mTurk samples to be as reliable as student samples 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Sprouse, 2010), as well as more ethnically diverse 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011). mTurk is particularly appropriate for a study investigating the behavior 
of employees (or potential employees), as the majority tend to be employed (Ipeirotis, 2010).  
Limitations 
Despite its strengths, this study did have several limitations. A control condition and a 
proctored CAT score were only available for the student sample, because it was impossible to 
test mTurk workers in a proctored setting. As discussed above, there are limitations to using a 
student sample, which calls into question the generalizability of the findings for the control 
condition.  
 Another limitation is that the experiment differed from selection scenarios in several 
meaningful ways. In this study, participants were motivated to perform well in order to avoid 
punishment (i.e., having to complete a long, boring vigilance task). In selection scenarios, job 
candidates are motivated to achieve a reward (i.e., getting a job). Within the framework of utility 
theory, this difference should not be meaningful; people make decisions in order to maximize the 
likelihood of valued outcomes, whatever those outcomes might be. However, this difference 
could meaningfully impact decision-making processes.  
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  Another meaningful difference between this study and selection scenarios is that, for 
both samples, this study represented a close-ended interaction: students completed the study and 
received credit; mTurk workers completed the study and were paid. In a selection scenario, the 
application procedure is often the beginning of a long and potentially complex relationship 
between employers and employees. Cheating someone in a close-ended interaction might 
represent a different situation to people than cheating someone with whom they are beginning a 
potentially long-term relationship. The outcome for this study was payment received at the end 
of the task; the outcome for job candidates is potentially a psychological contract between 
employer and employee, in which mutual beliefs, obligations, and expectations are established 
(Rousseau, 1989).  
Future research 
 The effectiveness of the probability of passing the test with cheating manipulation 
provides partial evidence that utility theory is a useful framework for understanding the decision-
making process in regard to cheating on online tests. The lack of significant findings in regard to 
the other manipulations, however, calls into question the applicability of this theory for this 
topic. Future research should attempt to test utility theory using different, and potentially more 
effective, manipulations of both the value and probability of different outcomes in regard to 
cheating on online tests.  For example, a stern warning that cheaters will most likely be caught 
might be more effective than mentioning what percentage of participant responses will be 
analyzed for cheating. When choosing a “high value of being caught cheating” manipulation, it is 




 It is likely that individual differences have an impact on decision-making processes in 
regard to cheating. Some individuals are probably likely to cheat regardless of how difficult it is, 
how severe the consequences are, or how likely it is that they will get caught; other individuals 
would probably refuse to cheat regardless of how easy it is, how superficial the consequences 
are, or how unlikely it is that they will get caught. The results of this study, showing that the 
majority of people who had access to the answer key did not use it (or at least, did not admit to 
using it), support the proposition that individual differences do play a role in cheating behavior. 
Future research should investigate what, and how malleable, these individual differences are. 
This research should be driven by a theoretical orientation, but has very practical applications. If 
it were possible to give a short intervention prior to testing that increased or decreased the level 
of these individual differences (e.g., ethical orientation), this could be a very useful tool for 
preventing cheating behavior on online tests. McTernan, Love, and Rettinger (2014), for 
example, found evidence that sensation seeking and impulsivity were positively related to 
cheating behavior, whereas empathetic perspective taking was negatively related to cheating. 
Another study by Ejei, Shahabi, and Alibazi (2012) found a negative relationship between both 
agreeableness and conscientiousness and cheating behavior.  
 Another area for future research would be to investigate which behaviors people consider 
“cheating.” In this study, cheating was explicitly explained to participants as the use of outside 
materials such as the Internet and reference books, having another person take the test in lieu of 
the legitimate participant, or going back and changing answers once participants were shown the 
correct answer. It is likely, however, that in a selection context individuals probably have very 
different ideas of what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable cheating behavior. For example, 
most people would probably agree that searching the Internet for answers is cheating, but what 
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about using cognitive enhancing drugs such as amphetamines? At least initially, these studies 
should be exploratory in nature, asking participants to describe strategies they use while test 
taking, and then asking them to rate them on whether or not they consider these strategies to be 
cheating. Studies could also be designed to present participants with several different options for 
cheating, and observe how the use of these strategies influences self-reported cheating behavior. 
It is possible that some participants do not self-report cheating because they do not believe their 
behavior constitutes cheating, even if potential employers do consider these strategies dishonest.  
 Finally, in my opinion, one of the most interesting findings of this study was that the vast 
majority of cheaters in both samples did not perform well enough on the CAT to be excused 
from the vigilance task. Utility theory assumes that the decision making process is a rational 
calculation of the value and probability of different outcomes. Why would a person risk the 
potential consequences of cheating without obtaining the positive outcome? Was it that they 
were unable to cheat effectively enough to “pass” the CAT and be excused from the vigilance 
task, or did they consider looking up a few answers as a lesser form of cheating? Did they think 
it was acceptable to look up answers to items they felt were “unfair”? This finding represents a 
paradox in cheating behavior, and should be further investigated.  
Summary and Conclusions 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the usefuleness of utility theory as a 
framework for understanding why some individuals decide to cheat. The manipulations were 
laregely ineffective, although some evidence was found that providing answers to participants 
does increase cheating behavior, and that cheating behavior can undermine the validity of 
cognitive ability tests. Despite the ineffectiveness of the manipulations, the experimental 
protocol appeared to be sound for investigating cheating behavior. Only a small percentage of 
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participants were able to identify the true purpose of the study, and a relatively large percentage 
of participants reported cheating. Future research should investigate whether utility theory is 
actually ineffective at explaining cheating decisions, or whether the manipulations used in this 
study were ineffective. Future research should also investigate other possible frameworks for 






Student: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest. 
  N M SD Min Max 
ACT 318 25.1 3.5 14.0 34.0 
SATper 91 0.66 0.14 0.201 0.97 
CAT 384 21.0 6.5 4.0 35.0 
Fake sum 384 2.1 1.1 0.0 5.0 
CAT2 244 20.4 5.8 5.0 32.0 
Note: SATper= SAT score expressed as a percentage; CAT= cognitive ability test 
score during session 1; Fake sum= number of fake items answered "correctly"; 







Student: Frequencies for dichotomous variables 
  0 1  
  Raw % Raw % Total 
Gender 50 28.7 124 71.3 174 
Suspect 228 95.8 10 4.2 238 
Cheat 200 84.4 37 15.6 237 
CATdummy 322 83.9 62 16.1 384 
Note: Gender=a dummy coded variable reflecting whether participants were 
male (0) or female (1); Suspect= a dummy coded variable reflecting whether 
participants suspected the study was about cheating (1) or not (0); CHEAT= a 
dummy coded variable reflecting whether participants self-reported cheating (1) 
or not (0); CATdummy=a binary variable reflecting whether participants scored 






Student: Correlation matrix for variables of interest. 
  ACT SATper CAT Fake sum CAT2 Suspect Gender CATdummy 
ACT -        
SATper +.56** -       
CAT +.46** +.19** -      
Fake Sum +.07** +.15** +.11** -     
CAT2 +.56** +.35** +.72** +.12** -    
Suspect +.07** -.16** +.01** +.03** +.00** -   
Gender -.06** +.24** +.00** +.14** -.01** -.14** -  
CATdummy +.28** +.15** .'+64** +.11** +.46** +.03** -.10** - 
Cheat -.23** -.13** +.14** -.17** +.03** +.08** +.05** +.18** 
Note: SATper= SAT score expressed as a percentage; Fake sum= number of fake answers participants answered correctly; CAT2=CAT 
score during session two; Suspect= a dummy coded variable reflecting whether participants suspected the study was about cheating (1) or 
not (0); Gender=a dummy coded variable reflecting whether participants were male (0) or female (1); CATdummy=a binary variable 
reflecting whether participants scored well enough to be excused from the vigilance task (1) or not (0); CHEAT= a dummy coded variable 
reflecting whether participants self-reported cheating (1) or not (0).  






mTurk: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest.  
  N M SD Min Max 
CAT 518 23.9 5.6 7 32 
Fake sum 518 0.8 0.9 0 5 
SATper 197 0.76 0.18 0.27 1.34 
ACT 151 27.3 4.7 11 35 
Age 515 37.2 12.6 18 76 
Note: Fake sum= number of fake items answered "correctly"; SATper= SAT 






mTurk: Frequencies for dichotomous variables 
  0 1  
  Raw % Raw % Total 
Gender 181 34.9 337 65.1 518 
Suspect 513 99.0 5 1.0 518 
Cheat 462 89.2 56 10.8 518 
CATdummy 511 98.6 7 1.4 518 
Note: Gender=a dummy coded variable reflecting whether participants were 
male (0) or female (1); Suspect= a dummy coded variable reflecting whether 
participants suspected the study was about cheating (1) or not (0); CHEAT= a 
dummy coded variable reflecting whether participants self-reported cheating (1) 
or not (0); CATdummy=a binary variable reflecting whether participants scored 






mTurk: Correlation matrix for variables of interest. 
  CAT CATdummy SATper ACT GEN Age Cheat Suspect 
CAT -        
CATdummy +.16** -       
SATper +.14** +.02** -      
ACT +.61** +.03** +.27** -     
Gender -.12** -.02** -.02** -.12** -    
Age +.05** -.03** +.00** -.02** +.29** -   
Cheat +.04** +.18** -.07** -.03** -.02** -.13** -  
Suspect +.02** -.01** +.03** -.02** +.03** +.09** -.03** - 
Fake sum +.25** +.54** +.13** +.12** -.08** +.04** +.09** +.07** 
Note: CATdummy=a binary variable reflecting whether participants scored well enough to be excused from the vigilance task (1) or not (0); 
SATper= SAT score expressed as a percentage; ACT=ACT score, with outliers removed; Gender=a dummy coded variable reflecting 
whether participants were male (0) or female (1); CHEAT= a dummy coded variable reflecting whether participants self-reported cheating 
(1) or not (0); Suspect= a dummy coded variable reflecting whether participants suspected the study was about cheating (1) or not (0); Fake 
sum= number of fake items answered correctly.  






Mean ACT, SAT, and CAT scores for mTurk and student samples.  
 Sample     
 0 1     
  n m sd n m sd t df p d 
ACT 151 27.3 4.7 318 25.1 3.5 5.59 233.8 <.001 0.531 
SATper 197 0.76 0.18 91 0.66 0.14 4.32 286 <.001 0.577 
CAT 518 23.9 5.6 384.0 21.0 6.5 6.770 749.2 <.001 0.478 







Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly between 







U p r 
mTurk 518 326.625 169192 34771.000 <.001 0.650 
Student 384 619.951 238061    






Proportion of participants who suspected the study was actually about 
cheating prior to debriefing in the mTurk and student samples.  
Suspect      
Sample No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
mTurk 513 5 518 15.514 1.000 <.001 0.151 
Student 152 10 162     






Proportion of participants who performed well enough on CAT to be 
excused from the vigilance task in the mTurk and student samples.  
Excused      
Sample No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
mTurk 511 7 518 68.324 1.000 <.001 0.275 
Student 322 62 384     






Proportion of self-reported cheaters in the mTurk and student samples.  
Self-reported 
cheating      
Sample No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
mTurk 462 56 518 6.636 1.000 .010 0.099 
Student 132 30 162     






Student: Effect of experimental factors on CAT score.  
  df F p η2 
Model 8 11.344 <.001  
Intercept 1 0.075 .785  
ACT 1 82.706 <.001 .218 
A 1 11.303 <.001 .030 
P 1 0.519 .472 .001 
V 1 0.006 .937 .000 
A*P 1 0.336 .563 .001 
A*V 1 0.318 .574 .001 
P*V 1 0.188 .665 .000 
A*P*V 1 0.647 .422 .002 
Error 284    
Total 293       
Note. A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability of being caught 






Student: Estimated marginal means of CAT score during session one 
by experimental condition.  
 A  P  V 
 0 1   0 1   0 1 
m 22.8 20.5  21.9 21.4  21.7 21.6 
se 0.5 0.5   0.5 0.5   0.5 0.5 
Note. A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability of 






mTurk: Effect of experimental factors on CAT score.  
  df F p η2 
Model 8 19.841 <.001  
Intercept 1 19.175 <.001  
ACT 1 106.217 <.001 .395 
A 1 19.639 <.001 .073 
P 1 0.652 .421 .002 
V 1 1.679 .197 .006 
A*P 1 0.001 .982 .000 
A*V 1 0.723 .397 .003 
P*V 1 4.157 .043 .015 
A*P*V 1 0.164 .686 .001 
Error 136    
Total 145       
Note. ACT= ACT score with 6 outliers removed; A=probability of passing the test with 






mTurk: Estimated marginal means of CAT score during session one by 
experimental condition.  
 A  P  V 
 0 1   0 1   0 1 
m 23.5 26.2  24.6 25.1  25.2 24.5 
se 0.4 0.5   0.4 0.4   0.4 0.4 
Note. A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability of 






mTurk: Pairwise comparisons for each combination of high/ low probability of being caught and high/ low value of being 
caught. A Bonferroni correction was used to compensate for experimentwise error rate.  
  Mean difference SE p d CI low CI high 
pv vs. pV 3.0 0.9 0.004 3.452961672 0.7 5.3 
pv vs. Pv 2.0 0.9 0.198 2.151679307 -0.5 4.5 
pv vs. PV 1.0 0.9 1 1.109965636 -1.4 3.3 
pV vs. Pv -1.0 0.9 1 -1.057877814 -3.5 1.5 
pV vs. PV -2.0 0.9 0.15 -2.26440678 -4.4 0.4 
Pv vs. PV 1.0 0.9 1.000 1.078389831 -1.5 3.5 
Note. p=low probability of being caught cheating; P=high probability of being caught cheating; v=low probability of being 






mTurk: Means and standard errors of combined 
experimental conditions, controlling for self-reported ACT.  
  M SE CI low CI high 
pv 26.1 0.6 25.0 27.3 
pV 23.2 0.6 22.0 24.4 
Pv 24.2 0.7 22.8 25.5 
PV 25.2 0.6 23.9 26.4 
Note. p=low probability of being caught cheating; P=high 
probability of being caught cheating; v=low probability of 






Table 18  
Student: Chi-square test of independence for CHEAT by experimental condition.  
  CHEAT           
Group 0 1 Total χ2 df p ϕc 
Pro 8 1 9     
apv 18 2 20     
apV 18 1 19     
aPv 17 1 18     
aPV 19 6 25     
Apv 12 2 14     
ApV 19 3 22     
APv 21 10 31     
APV 22 5 27     
Total 154 31 185 10.834 8 .211 0.185 
Note: CHEAT= self-reported cheating behavior, 0= did not report, 1=did report; Pro= 
proctored conditions; a= conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating 
was low; A=conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was high; 
p=conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low; P=conditions in which 
the probability of being caught cheating was high; v=conditions in which the value of being 






Student: Proportion of self-reported cheaters in conditions in which the probability of passing the test with 
cheating was low vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Self-reported cheating      
Probability of passing the test 
with cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 80 11 91 2.799 1.000 .094 0.123 
High 74 20 94     






Student: Proportion of self-reported cheaters in conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low 
vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Self-reported 
cheating      
Probability of being caught cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 75 9 84 4.027 1.000 .045 0.148 
High 79 22 101     






Student: Proportion of self-reported cheaters in conditions in which the value of being caught cheating was low 
vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Self-reported cheating      
Value of being caught 
cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 76 16 92 0.053 1.000 .818 -0.017 
High 78 15 93     






mTurk: Chi-square test of independence for CHEAT by experimental condition.  
  CHEAT           
Group 0 1 Total χ2 df p ϕc 
apv 55 7 62     
apV 67 8 75     
aPv 68 5 73     
aPV 67 9 76     
Apv 57 8 65     
ApV 50 4 54     
APv 48 7 55     
APV 50 8 58     
Total 462 56 518 2.833 7 .900 0.074 
Note: CHEAT= self-reported cheating behavior, 0= did not report, 1=did report; a= conditions in which the 
probability of passing the test with cheating was low; A=conditions in which the probability of passing the test 
with cheating was high; p=conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low; P=conditions 
in which the probability of being caught cheating was high; v=conditions in which the value of being caught 






mTurk: Proportion of self-reported cheaters in conditions in which the probability of passing the test with 
cheating was low vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Self-reported cheating      
Probability of passing the test 
with cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 257 29 286 0.298 1.000 .585 0.024 
High 205 27 232     






mTurk: Proportion of self-reported cheaters in conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low 
vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Self-reported 
cheating      
Probability of being caught cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 229 27 256 0.037 1.000 .848 0.008 
High 233 29 262     






mTurk: Proportion of self-reported cheaters in conditions in which the value of being caught cheating was low 
vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Self-reported cheating      
Value of being caught 
cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 228 27 255 0.026 1.000 .872 0.007 
High 234 29 263     






Student: Kruskal Wallis test for Fake Sum by experimental condition.  
Group N Mean Rank H df p 
apv 37 179.040    
apV 44 177.940    
aPv 37 210.810    
aPV 53 185.420    
Apv 40 173.790    
ApV 46 180.620    
APv 58 159.540    
APV 45 186.330    
Total 360   6.424 7 .491 
Note: a= conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was 
low; A=conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was 
high; p=conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low; 
P=conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was high; 
v=conditions in which the value of being caught cheating was low; V=conditions in 






Student: Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly between 










Whitney U p r 
Low 195 201.344 39262 16703 0.100 0.094 
High 189 183.376 34658    






Student: Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly between participants in 
conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was high vs. conditions in which it was low.  
Probability of 
being caught 




Whitney U p r 
Low 191 192.463 36760.5 18425 0.995 0.000 
High 193 192.536 37159.5    
Total 384           






Student: Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly between participants in 
conditions in which the value of being caught cheating is high vs. conditions in which it was low.  
Value of being 




Whitney U p r 
Low 196 192.543 37738.5 18416 0.994 0.000 
High 188 192.455 36181.5    






mTurk: Kruskal-Wallis test for Fake Sum by experimental condition.  
Group N Mean Rank H df p 
apv 62 250.660    
apV 75 239.310    
aPv 73 271.120    
aPV 76 240.650    
Apv 65 265.160    
ApV 54 290.220    
APv 55 260.140    
APV 58 269.570    
Total 518   6.955 7 .434 
Note: a= conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating 
was low; A=conditions in which the probability of passing the test with 
cheating was high; p=conditions in which the probability of being caught 
cheating was low; P=conditions in which the probability of being caught 
cheating was high; v=conditions in which the value of being caught cheating 






mTurk: Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly between participants in 
conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was high vs. conditions in which it was low.  
Probability of 
passing the test 




Whitney U p r 
Low 286 250.25 71571 30530 0.089 0.080 
High 232 270.91 62850    






mTurk: Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly between participants in 
conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating is high vs. conditions in which it is low.  
Probability of 
being caught 




Whitney U p r 
Low 256 259.36 66397 33501 0.982 0.001 
High  262 259.63 68024    






mTurk: Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly between participants in 
conditions in which the value of being caught cheating is high vs. conditions in which it is low.  
Value of being 




Whitney U p r 
Low 255 262.26 66876 32829 0.653 0.021 
High 263 256.83 67545    






Student: Chi-square test of independence for number of participants who performed well enough on the 
CAT to be excused from the vigilance task by experimental condition.  
  CHEAT           
Group 0 1 Total χ2 df p ϕc 
Pro 21 2 23     
apv 33 5 38     
apV 37 7 44     
aPv 33 4 37     
aPV 46 7 53     
Apv 31 9 40     
ApV 37 9 46     
APv 44 14 58     
APV 40 5 45     
Total 322 62 384 7.480 8 .486 0.074 
Note: Pro= proctored conditions; a= conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating 
was low; A=conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was high; p=conditions 
in which the probability of being caught cheating was low; P=conditions in which the probability of 
being caught cheating was high; v=conditions in which the value of being caught cheating was low; 






Student: Proportion of participants who performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task in 
conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was low vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Excused from 
vigilance task      Probability of passing the test with 
cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 170 25 195 3.236 1.000 .072 .092 
High 152 37 189     






Student: Proportion of participants who performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task in 
conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Excused from 
vigilance task      
Probability of being caught cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 159 32 191 0.104 1.000 .747 -.016 
High 163 30 193     






Student: Proportion of participants who performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the vigilance task in 
conditions in which the value of being caught cheating was low vs. conditions in which it was high. 
Excused from 
vigilance task      
Value of being caught cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
Low 162 34 196 0.427 1.000 .514 -.033 
High 160 28 188     






mTurk: Proportion of participants who performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task in conditions in which the probability of passing the test with cheating was low vs. 
conditions in which it was high. 
Excused from vigilance task    Probability of 
passing the test 
with cheating No Yes Total 
Fisher's exact 
sig. OR 
Low 285 1 286 0.049 0.210 
High 226 6 232   






mTurk: Proportion of participants who performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task in conditions in which the probability of being caught cheating was low vs. conditions in 
which it was high. 
Excused from vigilance task    Probability of 
being caught 
cheating No Yes Total 
Fisher's exact 
sig. OR 
Low 252 4 256 0.722 1.297 
High 259 3 262   






mTurk: Proportion of participants who performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task in conditions in which the value of being caught cheating was low vs. conditions in which 
it was high. 
Excused from vigilance task    
Value of being 
caught cheating No Yes Total 
Fisher's exact 
sig. OR 
Low 252 3 255 1.000 0.730 
High 259 4 263   






Student: Mean CAT scores of self-reported cheaters compared to participants who did not self-report cheating behavior.  
 Self-reported cheating     
 0 1     
  n M SD n M SD t df p d 






mTurk: Mean CAT scores of self-reported cheaters compared to participants who did not self-report cheating behavior.  
 Self-reported cheating     
 0 1     
  n M SD n M SD t df p d 






Student: Proportion of self-reported cheaters who performed well enough on the CAT to be excused from the 
vigilance task. 
Excused from vigilance 
task      Self-reported 
cheating No Yes Total χ2 df p ϕ 
0 134 20 154 5.026 1.000 .025 0.165 
1 22 9 31     






mTurk: Proportion of self-reported cheaters who performed well enough on the CAT to be 
excused from the vigilance task, compared to participants who did not self-report cheating.  
Excused from vigilance task    
Self-reported 
cheating No Yes Total 
Fisher's 
exact sig. OR 
No 459 3 462 0.003 6.620 
Yes 52 4 56   






Student: Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly 








Whitney U p r 
No 154 96.292 14829 1880.0 0.053 0.212 
Yes 31 76.645 2376    






mTurk: Mann-Whitney U test of differences in number of fake items answered correctly between participants 
who self-reported cheating and those who did not.  
Self-reported 




Whitney U p r 
No 462 257.97 119181.5 12228.5 0.466 0.055 
Yes 56 272.13 15239.5    






Student: CAT score during session two regressed on CAT score during session one. 
  b SE β t p 
CI 
(low) CI (high) 
Intercept 6.740 1.011  6.670 
 
p<.001 4.747 8.734 
CAT1 0.655 0.046 0.719 14.335 
 
p<.001 0.565 0.746 
R2 .517       
F 205.480    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 192       
∆R2 205.48       
∆F 1    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 192       
degrees of freedom residual 0             






Student: CAT score during session two regressed on CAT score during session one, as well as each of the 
experimental conditions.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 6.960 1.221  5.700 p<.001 4.551 9.368 
CAT1 0.655 0.046 0.719 14.124 p<.001 0.564 0.747 
A 0.863 0.594 0.076 1.452 .148 -0.309 2.035 
P -0.677 0.599 
-
0.060 -1.130 .260 -1.860 0.505 
V -0.493 0.588 
-
0.044 -0.839 .403 -1.652 0.666 
Pro -0.531 1.297 
-
0.023 -0.410 .683 -3.090 2.027 
R2 .526       
F 41.802    <.001   
degrees of freedom regression 5       
degrees of freedom residual 188       
∆R2 0.01       
∆F 0.943    .440   
degrees of freedom regression 4       
degrees of freedom residual 188             
Note. CAT1= CAT scores during session 1; A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability 






Student: CAT score during session two regressed on CAT score during session one, each of the 
experimental conditions, as well as the interactions between CAT score during session one and each of the 
experimental conditions.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 2.735 2.284  1.197 .233 -1.772 7.241 
CAT1 0.851 0.101 0.934 8.466 p<.001 0.653 1.049 
A 3.635 2.112 0.321 1.721 .087 -0.532 7.802 
P 2.068 2.140 0.183 0.967 .335 -2.153 6.290 
V 2.226 2.081 0.197 1.069 .286 -1.881 6.332 




0.179 .858 -10.479 8.739 




1.393 .165 -0.319 0.055 




1.356 .177 -0.319 0.059 




1.378 .170 -0.315 0.056 
CAT1*Pro 0.031 0.230 0.028 0.137 .892 -0.422 0.485 
R2 .543       
F 24.316    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 9       
degrees of freedom residual 184       
∆R2 0.017       
∆F 1.691    .154   
degrees of freedom regression 4       
degrees of freedom residual 184             
Note. CAT1= CAT scores during session 1; A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability 
of being caught cheating; V=value of being caught cheating; Pro=proctored session 1; 
CAT1*A=interaction between CAT1 and A; CAT1*P=interaction between CAT1 and P; 





Table 50  
Student: CAT score during session two regressed on CAT score during session one and self-reported 
cheating.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) 
CI 
(high) 
Intercept 7.297 1.023  7.133 p<.001 5.278 9.316 
CAT1 0.651 0.047 0.731 13.891 p<.001 0.558 0.743 
CHEAT -1.734 0.783 
-
0.117 -2.215 .028 -3.279 -0.189 
R2 .524       
F 96.512    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 2       
degrees of freedom residual 175       
∆R2 0.013       
∆F 4.906    .028   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 175             
Note. CAT1= CAT scores during session 1; CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported 






Student: CAT score during session two regressed on CAT score during session one,  self-reported 
cheating, and the interaction between CAT score during session one and self-reported cheating.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 6.262 1.114  5.620 p<.001 4.063 8.461 
CAT1 0.701 0.052 0.787 13.604 p<.001 0.599 0.802 
CHEAT 4.194 2.782 0.282 1.507 .134 -1.298 9.685 
CAT1*CHEAT -0.262 0.118 
-
0.426 -2.218 .028 -0.495 -0.029 
R2 .538       
F 67.422    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 174       
∆R2 0.013       
∆F 4.919    .028   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 174             
Note. CAT1= CAT scores during session 1; CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported 







Student: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT score.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 0.580 0.048  11.991  p<.001 0.484 0.677 
CAT1 0.004 0.002 0.189 1.815 .073 0.000 0.008 
R2 .036       
F 3.293    .073   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 89       
∆R2 3.293       
∆F 1    .073   
degrees of freedom regression 89       
degrees of freedom residual 0.073             






Student: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT score and each experimental condition.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 0.570 0.062  9.119 p<.001 0.446 0.694 







0.097 .923 -0.063 0.057 
P 0.010 0.030 0.036 0.331 .742 -0.049 0.069 
V 0.002 0.030 0.009 0.083 .934 -0.057 0.062 
Pro 0.072 0.076 0.109 0.946 .347 -0.079 0.223 
R2 .047       
F 0.842    .524   
degrees of freedom regression 5       
degrees of freedom residual 85       
∆R2 0.012       
∆F 0.257    .905   
degrees of freedom regression 4       
degrees of freedom residual 85             
Note. CAT1= CAT scores during session 1; A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability 






Student: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT score, each experimental condition, and the interaction 
between CAT score and experimental condition.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 0.552 0.128  4.328 p<.001 0.298 0.806 
CAT1 0.005 0.006 0.235 0.862 .391 -0.006 0.016 
A 0.009 0.111 0.033 0.080 .937 -0.213 0.231 




























0.870 .387 -0.013 0.005 
CAT1*V 0.002 0.005 0.218 0.519 .605 -0.007 0.012 
CAT1*Pro 0.014 0.016 0.422 0.853 .396 -0.018 0.045 
R2 .072       
F 0.694    .713   
degrees of freedom regression 9       
degrees of freedom residual 81       
∆R2 0.024       
∆F 0.532    .713   
degrees of freedom regression 4       
degrees of freedom residual 81             
Note. CAT1= CAT scores during session 1; A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability 
of being caught cheating; V=value of being caught cheating; Pro=proctored session 1; 
CAT1*A=interaction between CAT1 and A; CAT1*P=interaction between CAT1 and P; 





Table 55  
Student: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT and self-reported cheating.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) 
CI 
(high) 
Intercept 0.554 0.065  8.504 p<.001 0.423 0.684 







1.346 .184 -0.180 0.036 
R2 .089       
F 2.442    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 2       
degrees of freedom residual 50       
∆R2 0.033       
∆F 1.812    .184   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 50             
Note. CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating, 0=did not report cheating, 





Table 56  
Student: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT, self-reported cheating, and the interaction between CAT 
and self-reported cheating.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) 
CI 
(high) 
Intercept 0.536 0.070  7.634 p<.001 0.395 0.677 
CAT 0.007 0.003 0.003 2.086 .042 0.000 0.013 
CHEAT 0.068 0.212 0.212 0.319 .751 -0.359 0.494 
CAT*CHEAT -0.006 0.008 0.008 -0.681 .499 -0.022 0.011 
R2 .098       
F 1.765    .166   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 49       
∆R2 0.009       
∆F 0.464    .499   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 49             
Note. CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating, 0=did not report cheating, 






mTurk: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT score.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 0.586 0.049  12.006  p<.001 0.489 0.682 
CAT 0.007 0.002 0.269 3.732  p<.001 0.003 0.011 
R2 .073       
F 13.925    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 178       
∆R2 0.073       
∆F 13.925    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 1       






mTurk: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT score.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 0.588 0.051  11.467 p<.001 0.487 0.689 










0.082 -1.133 .259 -0.056 0.015 
V 0.019 0.018 0.075 1.041 .299 -0.017 0.054 
R2 .110       
F 5.393    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 4       
degrees of freedom residual 175       
∆R2 0.037       
∆F 2.436    .066   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 175             
Note. A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability of being caught cheating; V=value of 






mTurk: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT score.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 0.575 0.123  4.684 p<.001 0.333 0.818 







1.121 .264 -0.316 0.087 
P 0.008 0.103 0.033 0.081 .936 -0.195 0.211 
V 0.101 0.099 0.406 1.018 .310 -0.095 0.297 














0.844 .400 -0.011 0.004 
R2 .117       
F 3.244    .003   
degrees of freedom regression 7       
degrees of freedom residual 172       
∆R2 0.007       
∆F 0.447    .719   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 172             
Note. A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability of being caught cheating; V=value of 
being caught cheating;  CAT*A=interaction between CAT and A; CAT*P=interaction between CAT and P; 






mTurk: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT and self-reported cheating.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 0.603 0.050  12.104 p<.001 0.504 0.701 





0.146 -2.038 .043 -0.126 -0.002 
R2 .079       
F 7.651    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 2       
degrees of freedom residual 179       
∆R2 0.021       
∆F 4.151    .043   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 179             
Note. CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating, 0=did not report cheating, 






mTurk: Self-reported SAT regressed on CAT, self-reported cheating, and the interaction between CAT 
and self-reported cheating.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 0.578 0.053  10.996 p<.001 0.474 0.681 
CAT 0.008 0.002 0.282 3.721 p<.001 0.004 0.012 





0.541 -1.455 .147 -0.021 0.003 
R2 .090       
F 5.838    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 178       
∆R2 0.011       
∆F 2.117    .147   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 178             
Note. CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating, 0=did not report cheating, 






Student: Self-reported ACT regressed on CAT score.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 19.881 0.598  33.246  p<.001 18.704 21.057 
CAT1 0.244 0.027 0.456 9.115  p<.001 0.191 0.297 
R2 .208       
F 83.082    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 316       
∆R2 83.082       
∆F 1    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 316       
degrees of freedom residual 0             






Student: Self-reported ACT regressed on CAT score, as well as each of the experimental conditions.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 19.466 0.710  27.417 p<.001 18.069 20.863 
CAT1 0.248 0.026 0.464 9.370 p<.001 0.196 0.300 
A 1.236 0.360 0.176 3.439 p<.001 0.529 1.944 
P -0.323 0.358 
-
0.046 -0.900 .369 -1.028 0.383 
V -0.355 0.359 
-
0.051 -0.990 .323 -1.061 0.351 
Pro 0.931 0.806 0.063 1.156 .249 -0.654 2.516 
R2 .245       
F 20.293    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 5       
degrees of freedom residual 312       
∆R2 0.037       
∆F 3.847    .005   
degrees of freedom regression 4       
degrees of freedom residual 312             
Note. CAT1= CAT scores during session 1; A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability 






Student: Self-reported ACT on CAT score, each of the experimental conditions, as well as the interactions 
between CAT score and each of the experimental conditions.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 17.570 1.450  12.120 p<.001 14.718 20.422 
CAT1 0.337 0.064 0.629 5.226 p<.001 0.210 0.464 
A 4.065 1.248 0.579 3.258 p<.001 1.610 6.521 
P -1.048 1.216 
-
0.149 -0.863 .389 -3.440 1.343 
V 0.702 1.218 0.100 0.577 .565 -1.695 3.099 
Pro 2.599 3.184 0.176 0.816 .415 -3.666 8.865 
CAT1*A -0.133 0.056 
-
0.439 -2.381 .018 -0.243 -0.023 
CAT1*P 0.035 0.054 0.114 0.650 .516 -0.072 0.142 
CAT1*V -0.052 0.055 
-
0.171 -0.939 .348 -0.160 0.056 
CAT1*Pro -0.078 0.142 
-
0.119 -0.551 .582 -0.357 0.201 
R2 .262       
F 12.126    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 9       
degrees of freedom residual 308       
∆R2 0.016       
∆F 1.692    .152   
degrees of freedom regression 4       
degrees of freedom residual 308             
Note. CAT1= CAT scores during session 1; A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability 
of being caught cheating; V=value of being caught cheating; Pro=proctored session 1; 
CAT1*A=interaction between CAT1 and A; CAT1*P=interaction between CAT1 and P; 






Student: Self-reported ACT regressed on CAT and self-reported cheating.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 19.429 0.791  24.552 p<.001 17.865 20.992 
CAT 0.265 0.036 0.507 7.439 p<.001 0.194 0.335 
CHEAT -2.512 0.622 
-
0.275 -4.039 p<.001 -3.740 -1.283 
R2 .305       
F 33.187    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 2       
degrees of freedom residual 151       
∆R2 0.075       
∆F 16.310    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 151             
Note. CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating, 0=did not report cheating, 






Student: Self-reported ACT regressed on CAT, self-reported cheating behavior, and the interaction between 
CAT and self-reported cheating behavior.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 19.118 0.865  22.099 p<.001 17.408 20.827 
CAT 0.279 0.039 0.535 7.120 p<.001 0.202 0.357 
CHEAT -0.635 2.192 
-
0.070 -0.290 0.772 -4.967 3.696 
CAT*CHEAT -0.083 0.093 
-
0.219 -0.893 0.374 -0.268 0.101 
R2 .309       
F 22.361    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 150       
∆R2 0.004       
∆F 0.797    0.374   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 150             
Note. CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating, 0=did not report cheating, 





Table 67  
mTurk: Self-reported ACT regressed on CAT score.   
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 12.397 1.410  8.792  p<.001 9.609 15.184 
CAT 0.595 0.056 0.669 10.720  p<.001 0.486 0.705 
R2 .447       
F 114.918    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 142       
∆R2 0.447       
∆F 114.918    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 1       






mTurk: Self-reported ACT regressed on CAT score, as well as each of the experimental conditions.  
 b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 11.962 1.489  8.035 p<.001 9.019 14.906 
CAT  0.636 0.059 0.714 10.840 p<.001 0.520 0.752 
A -1.208 0.583 
-
0.136 -2.074 .040 -2.361 -0.056 
P -0.153 0.552 
-
0.017 -0.278 .782 -1.246 0.939 
V 0.094 0.554 0.011 0.170 .866 -1.001 1.189 
R2 .464       
F 30.114    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 4       
degrees of freedom residual 139       
∆R2 0.017       
∆F 1.467    .226   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 139             
Note. A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability of being caught cheating; V=value of 






mTurk: Self-reported ACT on CAT score, each of the experimental conditions, as well as the interactions 
between CAT score and each of the experimental conditions.  
 b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 11.643 3.301  3.527 p<.001 5.115 18.171 
CAT 0.652 0.129 0.732 5.073 p<.001 0.398 0.906 
A 1.462 3.204 0.165 0.456 .649 -4.875 7.799 




0.090 .928 -6.194 5.652 




0.289 .773 -7.100 5.290 




0.853 .395 -0.350 0.139 
CAT*P 0.002 0.117 0.006 0.019 .985 -0.230 0.234 
CAT*V 0.042 0.122 0.120 0.341 .734 -0.200 0.283 
R2 .468       
F 17.104    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 136       
∆R2 0.004       
∆F 0.335    .800   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 136             
Note. A=probability of passing the test with cheating; P=probability of being caught cheating; V=value of 
being caught cheating; CAT*A=interaction between CAT and A; CAT*P=interaction between CAT and P; 






mTurk: Self-reported ACT regressed on CAT and self-reported cheating.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 12.464 1.448  8.607 p<.001 9.601 15.327 
CAT 0.594 0.057 0.662 10.494 p<.001 0.482 0.706 
CHEAT 0.117 0.829 0.009 0.141 0.888 -1.521 1.755 
R2 .438       
F 55.243    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 2       
degrees of freedom residual 142       
∆R2 0.000       
∆F 0.020    0.888   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 142             
Note. CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating, 0=did not report cheating, 






mTurk: Self-reported ACT regressed on CAT, self-reported cheating behavior, and the interaction between 
CAT and self-reported cheating behavior.  
  b SE β t p CI (low) CI (high) 
Intercept 11.958 1.614  7.410 p<.001 8.768 15.149 
CAT 0.614 0.063 0.685 9.695 p<.001 0.489 0.740 
CHEAT 2.575 3.538 0.196 0.728 0.468 -4.419 9.569 




0.715 0.476 -0.382 0.179 
R2 .440       
F 36.872    p<.001   
degrees of freedom regression 3       
degrees of freedom residual 141       
∆R2 0.002       
∆F 0.511    0.476   
degrees of freedom regression 1       
degrees of freedom residual 141             
Note. CHEAT=dummy coded variable representing self-reported cheating, 0=did not report cheating, 



















Arthur, W. Jr., Glaze, R. M., Villado, A. J., & Taylor, J. E. (2010). The magnitude and 
extent of cheating and response distortion effects on unproctored Internet-based  
tests of cognitive ability and personality. International Journal of Selection and  
Assessment, 18, 1-16.  
Arthur, W., Jr., Glaze, R. M., Villado, A. J., & Taylor, J. E. (2009). Unproctored Internet- 
test based tests of cognitive ability and personality: Magnitude of cheating  
and response distortion. Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2, 39-45.  
Barak, A. (2010). Internet-based psychological testing and assessment. In R. Kraus, G.  
Stricker & C. Speyer (Eds.), Online counseling: A handbook for mental health  
professionals (2nd ed, pp. 225-256). London, UK: Academic Press. 
Beaty, J. C., Fallon, J. D., Shepherd, W. J., & Barrett, C. (2002). Proctored versus  
unproctored web-based administration of a cognitive ability test. Paper presented  
at the 17th Annual conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational  
Psychology, Toronto. 
Beaty, J. C., Nye, C. D., Borneman, M. J., Kantrowitz, T. M., Drasgow, F., & Grauer, E. 
 (2011). Proctored versus unproctored Internet tests: Are unproctored  
noncognitive tests as predictive of job performance? International Journal of  
Selection and Assessment, 19, 1-10.  
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new  
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological  




Chapman, D. S., & Webster, J. (2003). The use of technologies in the recruiting,  
screening, and selection processes for job candidates. International Journal of  
Selection and Assessment, 11, 113–120. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.).  
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Dinges, D. F., & Powell, J. W. (1985). Microcomputer analyses of performance on a  
portable, simple visual RT task during sustained operations. Behavior Research  
Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 17, 652-655. 
Do, Ben-Roy (2009). Research on unproctored Internet testing. Industrial and  
Organizational Psychology, 2, 49-51.  
Drasgow, F., Nye, C. D., Guo, J., & Tay, L. (2009). Cheating on proctored tests: The  
other side of the unproctored debate. Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2, 46-48.  
Ejei, J., Shahabi, R., & Alibazi, H. (2012). Relationship between personality traits and  
self reported academic cheating in high school students. Journal Of Psychology,  
15, 412-424.  
Erickson, M. L., & Smith W. B. (1974). On the relationship between self-reported and  
actual deviance: An empirical test. Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, 1, 106-113.  
Flynn, S., Reichard, M., & Slane, S. (2001). Cheating as a function of task outcome and  
Machiavellianism. The Journal of Psychology, 121, 423-427.  
Frey, M. C., & Detterman, D. (2004). Scholastic assessment or g? The relationship  
between the scholastic assessment test and general cognitive ability.  




Garavalia, L., Olson, E., Russel, E., & Christensen, L. (2007). How do student cheat? In  
E. M. Anderman & T. B. Murdock (Eds.) Psychology of Academic Cheating.  
Academic Press: San Diego, 33-55.  
Gibby, R. E., Ispas, D., McCloy, R. A., & Biga, A. (2009). Moving beyond challenges to  
make unproctored Internet testing a reality. Industrial and Organizational  
Psychology, 2, 64-68.  
Guo, J., & Drasgow, F. (2010). Identifying cheating on unproctored Internet tests: The Z- 
tests and the likelihood ratio test. International Journal of Selection and  
Assessment, 18, 351-364. 
Haney, W. M., & Clarke, M. J. (2007). Cheating on tests: Prevalence, detection, and  
implications for online testing. In E. M. Anderman & T. B. Murdock (Eds.)  
Psychology of Academic Cheating. Academic Press: San Diego, 255-288.  
Harding, T. S., Mayhew, M. J., Finelli, C. J., & Carpenter, D. D. (2007). The theory of  
planned behavior as a model of academic dishonesty in engineering and  
humanities undergraduates. Ethics and Behavior, 17, 255-279.  
Hense, R., Golden, J. H., & Burnett, J. (2009). Making the case for unproctored Internet  
testing: Do the rewards outweigh the risks? Industrial and Organizational  
Psychology, 2, 20-23.  
Ipeirotis, P. (2010). Demographics of Mechanical Turk. CeDER-10–01 working paper,  
New York University. 
Lievens, F., &Burke, E. (2011). Dealing with threats inherent in unproctored Internet  
testing of cognitive ability: Results from a large-scale operational test program.  
Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 84, 817-824.  
175 
 
Loh, S., Lamond, N,  Dorrian, J., Roach, G., & Dawson, D. (2004). The validity of  
psychomotor vigilance tasks of less than 10-minute duration. Behavior Research  
Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36, 339–346. 
Mayer, R. E., Stull, A. T., Campbell, J., Almeroth, K., Bimber, B., Chun, D., & Knight,  
A. (2006). Overestimation bias in self-reported SAT scores. Educational Psychology 
Review, 19, 443-454.  
McTernan, M., Love, P., & Rettinger, D. (2014). The influence of personality on the  
decision to cheat. Ethics & Behavior, 24, 53-72.  
Mumford, M. D., Murphy, S. T., Connely, S., Hill, J. H., Antes, A. L., Brown, R. P.,  
Devenport, L. D. (2007). Environmental influences on ethical decision making:  
Climate and environmental predictors of research integrity. Ethics and Behavior,  
17, 337-366. 
Naglieri, J. A., Drasgow, F., Schmit, M., Handler, L., Prifitera, A., Margolis, A., et al.  
(2004). Psychological testing on the Internet: New problems, old issues.  
American Psychologist, 59, 150–162. 
Nye, C. D., Do, B.-R., Drasgow, F., & Fine, S. (2008). Two-step testing in employee  
selection: Is score inflation a problem? International Journal of Selection and  
Assessment, 16, 112-120. 
Rettinger, D. A. (2007). Applying decision theory to academic integrity decisions. In E.  
M. Anderman and Tamera B. Murdock (Eds.) Psychology of Academic Cheating.  





Reynolds, D. H., Wasko, L. E., Sinar, E. F., Raymark, P. H., & Jones, J. A. (2009). UIT  
or not UIT? That is not the only question. Industrial and Organizational  
Psychology, 2, 52-57.  
Rousseau, D. M. (1989). Psychological and implied contracts in organizations. Employee  
Responsibilities And Rights Journal, 2, 121-139. 
Sackett, P. R., Borneman, J., & Connelly, B. S. (2008). High stakes testing in higher 
education and employment: Appraising the evidence for validity and fairness. American 
Psychologist, 63, 215-227.  
Schmidt, F.L. & Hunter, J. (2004). General mental ability in the world of work: 
Occupational attainment and job performance. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 86, 162–173. 
Sprouse, J. (2011). A validation of Amazon Mechanical Turk for the collection of  
acceptability judgments in linguistic theory. Behavior Research Methods, 43, 155-167.  
Tippins, N. T. (2009). Internet alternatives to traditional proctored testing: Where are we  
know? Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2, 2-10.  
Tippins, N. T. (2009b). Where is the unproctored Internet testing train headed now? 
 Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2, 69-76.  
Tippins, N. T., Beaty, J., Drasgow, F., Gibson, W. M., Pearlman, K., Segall, D. O., &  
Shepherd, W. (2006). Unproctored Internet testing in employment settings.  
Personnel Psychology, 59, 189-225.  
Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2009). Mindful judgment and decision making. Annual  
Reviews, 60, 53-85. 
 
